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Factors That Affect Task Prioritization on the Flight Deck 

CHAPTER I: 

INTRODUCTION 

The present research investigates the factors that affect task prioritization on 
the flight deck of commercial, transport aircraft.  The theoretical foundations of the 
investigation of human behaviors in a multiple, concurrent task environments lie in 
the general research area known as Task Management (TM).  Research efforts over 
the past decade have studied aviation doma1l1s specifically, and this area is known 
as Cockpit Task Management (CTM). 
The scope of the present work begins with a review of existing literature 
related to CTM, presented in Chapter 2.  Chapter 3 approaches CTM not from an 
engineering, system-based approach, as was done in the past, but rather from a 
human performance-based approach, reviewing experimental psychology literature 
regarding how humans perform and manage multiple, concurrent tasks.  From 
Chapter 3, a fundamental research question emerges: What are the factors that 
affect task prioritization? 
Chapter 4 documents an initial experimental study that had the objective of 
identifying the possible factors that influence task prioritization in the operational 
context of a commercial aircraft flight deck.  The study was performed in a part­
task flight simulator using commercial airline pilots as subjects.  The data collected 
in Chapter 4 suggests 12 possible factors that emerged as candidates for 
prioritization factors used by pilots on the flight deck.  These 12 factors were used 
to develop a theoretical model of factors that affect task prioritization. 
Chapter 5 documents a second experimental study that begins with the 
model of task prioritization with the objective of collecting data to support the 
actual use of the proposed factors.  From this data, conclusions were drawn 
suggesting new knowledge has been discovered regarding how humans prioritize 
multiple tasks on the flight deck. 2 
Finally, Chapter 6 is  a summary, bringing together the key points and 
findings explored throughout the entire project. 3 
CHAPTER 2: 

COCKPIT TASK MANAGEMENT: LITERATURE REVIEW 

Introduction 
During the late 1990s, there is evidence that air travel is, statistically 
speaking, a very safe form of transportation.  However, this was not always the 
case.  In the 1950s, when commercial jet transport was introduced, the worldwide 
accident rate approached 30 accidents per million departures.  By the end of 1997, 
that rate has dropped to approximately 1.4 accidents per million departures 
(Boeing, 1998). 
This decrease can be attributed to improved aircraft technologies, improved 
air traffic control (ATC), industry infrastructure, operations and maintenance 
procedures, training and regulations.  Although these improvements are significant, 
and the accident rate is relatively low, it has been stable for approximately the last 
20 years.  The leveling of the accident rate has occurred despite innovations like 
improved computerized flight simulators, expanded radar coverage, high-tech 
devices that warn pilots of nearby aircraft, proximity to terrain, precarious aircraft 
altitude, and hazardous weather and wind-shear conditions.  It is sobering to realize 
that if Boeing's and Airbus's worldwide aviation traffic growth projections of 5%, 
compounded annually, are accurate, one major accident will occur each week by 
2014 (Flight Safety Foundation, 1998). 
The aviation industry strives for continuous safety improvements through 
many channels, including better pilot training, better aircraft inspection and 
maintenance techniques, and new safety technologies. In the next century, for 
example, all commercial jets will use satellites to navigate and communicCl.te their 
positions to air-traffic controllers on the ground; a tremendous advantage over 
ground-based navigation aids and radar that lose "sight" of planes once they fly 
beyond the horizon. 4 
Additionally, aviation industry organizations around the world are working 
together to reduce the accicknt rate.  For example, in the U.S., airlines, labor 
unions, and manufacturers have joined the FAA in  a Commercial A viation Safety 
Team (CAST) that is  working to  achieve an 80 percent reduction in the rate of fatal 
commercial accidents of the next 10 years (Boeing, 1999). 
So where will these safety improvements come from?  Mechanical 
equipment in aircraft, such as engines, hydraulic systems, and electrical systems 
have many years of development and refinement in theIr history.  Manufacturing 
processes used for building aircraft use the latest materials and technologies and 
produce precise and consistent components, which allow for aircraft to be 
assembled according to very high tolerances and exceptional quality.  There are 
continually small improvements in these areas yet, as will be discussed below, this 
will probably not be the source for a large reduction in the accident rate. 
Inside the aircraft, the instruments, avionics and electronics have also 
evolved to show significant improvements over the past several decades.  "Glass" 
cockpits with integrated displays, Flight Management Systems (FMSs) and 
autopilots are highly reliable and allow the pilot to fly the aircraft more precisely, 
economically and with improved safety.  Each year, there are a number of new 
technologies introduced into the cockpit with promises of improved safety. 
However, with these new devices, experts are concerned about the changing role of 
the human from an active pilot to a systems monitor.  This has been a source of 
considerable debate for many years (Wiener and Curry, 1980).  Many experts agree 
that adding more technology and automation to the cockpit may actually decre'ase 
aviation safety in the future by removing the human, with its unique qualities, from 
a decision-making role in the cockpit. 
If the safety improvements are not likely to come from the aircraft 
hardware, then how can the accident rate be reduced? 
At the risk of repeating a commonly quoted statistic, flight crew error has 
been identified as a primary cause in approximately 70% of all hull loss accidents 
of commercial jet aircraft (Boeing, 1998).  This figure appears to be even higher 5 
(82%) in a study conducted by the Flight Safety Foundation which analyzed 287 
approach ancllanding accidents between 1980 and 1996 (Flight Safety, 1999). 
Given these statistics and the desire to reduce the accident rate, it appears 
obvious that perhaps the most rational area to look for improvements in aviation 
safety is in  the nature of human errors in  the cockpit. 
Cockpit Task Management: A Topic Worthy of Study? 
Cockpit Task Management 
The primary focus of the present research is Cockpit Task Management 
(CTM).  Formally, CTM is the initiation, monitoring, prioritization, execution, and 
termination of multiple, concurrent tasks by flight crews (Funk, 1991).  In other 
words, it is a theory of how humans manage and perform multiple, concurrent 
functions while in the operational context of an aircraft flight deck. 
CTM is practiced every day by pilots and almost without exception, pilots 
perform it satisfactorily and fly many thousands of hours without incidents or 
accidents.  However CTM on the flight deck is a legitimate safety concern for 
commercial transport aircraft.  Several studies presented below have shown that 
CTM errors contribute significantly to aircraft incidents and accidents. 
CTM on the flight deck is not new; pilots have always done it.  Rather, 
recent advances in cognitive psychology, engineering psychology and associated 
methods have been able to better identify and investigate it.  CTM appears to be a 
large part of the of the crew's role on the flight deck, yet understanding of it is in its 
infancy and design processes have yet to adequately address it.  As the existing 
aircraft fleet is upgraded with new avionics technologies, and new aircraft designs 
are developed, the complexity of the human-machine interface continues to 
increase.  It  is of paramount importance that human cognitive limitations are 
considered in these designs, and we attempt to eliminate the accidents that have 
been attributed, in part, to CTM errors. 6 
CTM Terms 
As with most research fields, a specific vernacular is  used to discuss the 
theories, models and concepts of CTM.  A set of terms and definitions are 
presented helow to provide a basis for further discussion of CTM.  Funk (1991) 
formalized these terms in his primary work in this area, which have been 
subsequently used in much of the CTM research to date. 
Behaviors are a collection of system input, state and output values over 
time.  A system exhibits a behavior if observed values of input, state, and output 
values match those of the behavior.  For instance, hy increasing the throttle settings 
(input), the aircraft accelerates to rotation speed (state). and begins to fly (output). 
The aircraft exhibits the flying behavior by matching the inputs. state and outputs 
of the flying behavior. 
A goal for a system, such as an aircraft, is defined by a set of desired 
behaviors.  If  one of the behaviors is realized, then the goal is achieved.  Otherwise, 
the goal is not achieved.  For a commercial air transport mission. the primary goal 
might be to transport people large distances to a destination quickly, comfortably 
and economically while maximizing the safety of the passengers and crew.  From 
this primary goal, many suhgoals can be identified and spawned as a set of 
behaviors consistent with those of the goal. but of limited scope with respect to the 
primary goal.  For example, in a flight mission, a suhgoal may to climb to an 
altitude established by air traffic control (ATC), say 15.000 ft.  This subgoal is 
consistent with the primary goal, but identifies more specific behaviors that may 
lead to the realization of the subgoal and eventually, the primary goal. 
A task is a process that is completed to cause a system to achieve a goal. 
The processing of a task to achieve a goal requires resources, which may be other 
systems or subsystems.  For example, to prepare an aircraft for departure, the 
resources from the human system may be necessary.  In general, tasks require 
resources to achieve a goal. 
Resources may take the form of equipment such as autopilots, radios, 
displays and controls.  Human resources include the people on the flight deck, such 7 
as  the captain, first office or flight engineer.  Human resources can be decomposed 
into subsystems, such as physical and mental resources, and mental resources can 
be  further decomposed into subsystems SLlch as working memory, and attention 
(Wickens, 1992). 
At any time, tasks can be in anyone of five possible states (See Figure 2­
I.).  Initially, a task is latent, meaning that it is present or potential, but not 
currently evident.  When the task's initial event is imminent, the task moves to the 
pellding state, where it follows the initial event into the active state.  A task moves 
into active ill progress, when resources are allocated to the task.  From the active in 
progress state, the task can return to the active state (if resources are deallocated) or 
it can move to the terminated state (if the task's goal is achieved or is 
unachievable).  Additionally, the task can move directly from the active to the 
terminated state if the task's goal becomes achieved during a period when no 
resources are currently allocated to the task. 
I 
I 
I  goal 
___---­ achieved or 
(/  actlve:;~n)_____unachievable 
~  progress 
'---­
resources t 
allocated  I  1 resources 
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Figure 2.1  Task States (Adapted from Funk, 1991). 
The level ofspecification is the extent to which subgoals are identified.  In 
the analysis of flight deck tasks, the level of specification can be decomposed into 8 
many simple, specific tasks.  For instance, a task as simple as advancing the 
throttles can be broken down into individual motor tasks specifying very detailed 
movements.  This is  usually not desired in the study of tasks on the flight deck, and 
a morc realistic and manageable level of specificity is adopted.  Thus, the task 
"prepare aircraft for departure" may be an appropriate level of detail in much of 
CTM research. 
Funk (1991) identified the notion of an agenda, which facilitates the study 
of CTM.  An agenda is a hierarchical structure of tasks to be completed during a 
flight.  As each task becomes relevant to the flight, it will move through the states 
identified in Figure 2.1.  Each task in the agenda has its own goal, and if multiple 
tasks become active simultaneously, they are called concurrent tasks. 
As multiple, concurrent tasks enter the active state it is possible for the 
resource requirements to overwhelm available resources.  This is particularly 
relevant when more human resources are required than are currently available.  In 
other words, task performance is limited by resource availability.  The 
inconsistency is obvious when multiple tasks require physical resources like hands 
or eyes, but not so apparent are the instances where conflicting demands are placed 
on cognitive resources.  Task conflict occurs when task resource requirements 
exceed resource availability. 
Funk's later work on the concept of an agenda led him to the concept of 
agenda management (Funk, et aI.,  1997; Funk and Braune, 1999).  Definitions and 
terminologies were changed slightly to incorporate the idea of an actor.  An actor is 
an entity that is capable of goal-directed activity.  An  actor can be a human, but can 
also be flight deck automation equipment such as autopilots, flight management 
systems, or automated warning and alerting systems.  Additionally, he stated that 
actors can have conflicting goals, and these conflicts may lead to conflicting 
actions.  Although this was a valuable concept, the present research continues to 
use the term Cockpit Task Management (CTM) to maintain consistency with 
prcvious work. 9 
CTM Errors 
The underlying causes of aircraft accidents usually fall  into the three broad 
categories of mechanical factors, weather factors, and pilot error.  CTM errors, of 
course, fall  under the latter category.  A classic example of the failure of pilots to 
perform proper CTM comes from the Eastern Airlines L-l011  accident near Miami 
(NTSB, 1973).  In this instance, the crew failed to attend to the primary task of 
!lying the airplane while attempting to diagnose a landing gear status lamp failure. 
This crew misallocated resources to tasks that, in hindsight, were obviously of low 
priority compared to the task of keeping the aircraft in the air.  The result of this 
CTM error: 99 fatalities.  The Eastern Airline accident is but a single example of a 
CTM error that may have contributed to an aircraft accident.  Chou (1991) and 
Madhavan (1993) provide tens of CTM error examples that are presented and 
analyzed in depth. 
Chou (1991) developed a CTM error taxonomy to aid in the analysis of 
accidents like the Miami accident.  The purpose of this taxonomy was to provide a 
tool to analyze incident and accident data to determine, in a consistent manner, if 
CTM errors were present. The CTM error taxonomy presents three error categories: 
Task initiation errors, task prioritization errors and task termination errors.  Within 
each of these categories, specific errors can be classified according to their nature 
(see Table 2.1).  This taxonomy was then subsequently applied in several studies of 
CTM errors in accidents, incidents and a part-task simulator study. 10 
Error Categories  Possible Classifications 
Task initiation  Early 
Late 
Incorrect 
Lacking 
Task prioritization  Incorrect 
Task termination  Early 
Late 
Incorrect 
Lacking 
Table 2.1  CTM Error Taxonomy (Adapted from Chou, et aI.,  1996). 
CTM Errors in Aircraft Accidents 
Using the preliminary theory of CTM and the CTM error taxonomy, Chou 
(1991) performed a study of aircraft accidents.  His hypothesis was that CTM 
errors contribute, at least in part, to a significant number of aircraft accidents. 
He reviewed 324 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident 
reports.  A first pass eliminated accidents that clearly did not involve CTM errors. 
Of the 76 remaining accidents, he reinterpreted the NTSB findings into the CTM 
error taxonomy.  It is important to specify that he did not perform his own accident 
investigation, but used the findings of the NTSB as data to be analyzed using the 
proposed CTM error taxonomy. 
His findings were that in 76 of the 324 accidents (23%), CTM errors were 
present.  While these are significant findings, Chou is careful to point out that the 
accidents cannot be attributed to CTM errors alone, but that CTM errors may have 
contributed to the accidents. 
CTM Errors in Aircraft Incidents 
In a similar study, Madhavan (1993) performed a CTM error study of 
A viation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident reports.  An incident, in the 11 
aviation domain, signifies a regulation violation or an unsafe night condition, but 
does not involve a catastrophic event like an accident.  Madhavan's hypothesis was 
that CTM errors were significantly present in  aircraft incidents. 
He selected 470 ASRS reports which included in-flight engine emergencies, 
controlled night towards terrain, and terminal phases of flight (final approach). 
The ASRS reports, which contain a narrative of the incident, where used as that 
data to drive the analysis using the CTM error taxonomy. 
The results found that of the 420 incident reports analyzed, 231  (49%) 
contained CTM errors.  In  fact, a total of 349 CTM errors were found in the 231 
incidents.  Madhavan is careful to point out that his method relied heavily on the 
reporter's own admission of misallocation of attention and that the CTM error may 
not have been the primary cause of the incident. 
CTM Errors ill a Part-task Simulator 
In a different approach to investigation of CTM errors from the previous 
studies, Chou (1991) performed a part-task simulator study, with the objective of 
eliciting CTM errors in a laboratory environment, rather than reviewing reports of 
errors which occured in an operational environment 
His method was to have 24 subjects fly a single-pilot, part-task simulator 
consisting of three networked computers simulating a generic, two-engine 
commercial transport aircraft.  The varied conditions of the flight scenarios were 
the workload requirements, the number of concurrent tasks and the complexity of 
the flight path.  The performance metrics for the study were the average time to 
respond to equipment faults, the root-mean-square of flight path error, task 
prioritization score and the number of tasks that were initiated late. 
His findings indicated that CTM errors increase with an increase in 
workload and a combined effect with flight path complexity and the number of 
concurrent tasks. 12 
CTM Errors alld Level ofAutomatioll 
As was mentioned in  the introduction, a controversial issue within the 
human factors community is  the idea that aircraft automation increases safety. 
Wilson (1998) performed an  ASRS study ro examine the effect of the level of 
automation on the rate of task prioritization errors on the flightdeck. 
Her method was to randomly select 420 ASRS reports.  210 reports were 
selected from aircraft classified by the ASRS as advanced technology (high 
automation) and 210 from conventional technology (low automation) aircraft.  The 
other requirements for selection of reports were that the aircraft were large 
commercial jets with two pilots flight decks and the incident occulTed between 
1988 - 1993. 
She reviewed the report narratives for task prioritization errors and found 
that the rate of CTM errors was higher in the aircraft with the advanced technology 
automation.  However, she was careful to acknowledge that the rate of CTM errors 
in  high automation aircraft showed signs of slowing, which may indicate that pilots 
are becoming more familiar and proficient with automation. 
Summary 
The investigation of CTM under Funk is approaching almost a decade in 
duration.  First, identification of CTM as a cognitive process was conceptualized 
and formalized.  Next, an error taxonomy of CTM was developed and applied in 
several studies of accidents, incidents and a part-task simulator.  These studies all 
contribute supporting evidence to one critical point: CTM is significant to system 
safety and system effectiveness. 
The next logical research question, then, is what can be done about CTM 
errors?  Do the solutions lie in better pilot selection or training?  Perhaps a better 
pilot-vehicle interface design would reduce CTM errors.  How about a pilot aid to 
facilitate CTM? 13 
While all of these have had some r,  '\  h activity, only the last, facilitation 
of CTM, has attempted to specifically add:  1 nprovement in pilot task 
management performance.  This topic wil]  J,scussed in  the next section. 
CTM Facilitation 
The fundamental concept behind C',1 facilitation is to assist the pilot in the 
task management function.  While to date.  . lkS not addressed better training or 
equipment design, surely those are areas r"  . \\ith opportunity.  Rather, CTM 
facilitation has been directed at assisting th  . pi lot with CTM functions such as: 
I.  Maintaining a current model of aircraf c;tate and current flight deck tasks 
2.  Monitoring task state and status 
3.  Computing task priority 
4.  Reminding the pilots of all tasks that <,' luld be in progress 
5.  Suggesting that the pilots attend to  tas~> that do not show satisfactory progress 
Concurrent to the research efforts 111  identifying and characterizing CTM 
were efforts directed at aiding pilots with the management of tasks on the flight 
deck.  The present section presents several efforts directed at  enhancing and 
facilitating CTM though the use of pilot aids. 
While there are tens or hundreds {)f examples of experimental pilot aids, this 
review focuses on those specifically directed at management of tasks.  At the 
highest level, there are two endpoints to  <l  spectrum of task management pilot aids: 
procedural scripts and cognitive models of the pilot, which perform tasks in 
differing levels of automation (Funk and Lind, 1992).  The limitation of the purely 
procedural script approach is that it lacks the power and especially the flexibility 
needed for assisting the pilot in a true operational environment.  On the other hand, 
the pilot model-based approach may be unrealistic, as cognitive models are still so 
limited (Anonymous, as cited in Funk alld Lind,  1992). ---------------------
14 
Task Support System 
The research performed by Punk and Lind (1992) was to approach task 
management at  an  intermediate level of complexity between procedural scripts and 
pilot cognitive models.  The Task Support System (TSS) was developed as part of a 
prototype avionics system designed to improve pilot situational awareness and 
reduce manual and mental workload through advanced software and information 
display methodologies.  The TSS was task-oriented, providing greater flexibility 
than rigid checklist-oriented systems.  Yet it contained no explicit pilot model, 
instead relying on the structure of the pilot's tasklsubtask hierarchy to guide its 
operation. 
The TSS was essentially an advanced, integrated avionics configuration that 
consisted of a collection of two types of specialized, active software units called 
agents.  Each system in the pilot's environment was represented by a system agent, 
and communicated with other agents as to its status.  A task agent assumed 
responsibility for the completion of each specific task.  Task agents helped the pilot 
perform tasks by configuring displays, monitoring his actions, providing procedural 
assistance, making recommendations, and completing some actions automatically. 
The experimental evaluation of the TSS in a simulated environment resulted 
in  improved performance on some tasks, moderately reduced workload and a 
preference of the TSS system over a baseline avionics configuration. 
Cockpit Task Mallagemellt System 
Following the successful demonstration of the TSS, Funk and Kim (1995) 
extended the theory behind CTM to create the Cockpit Task Management System 
(CTMS), which included goal representation.  They defined a goal, in the context 
of the flight deck, as a desired aircraft or system state, and a task as a process to 
achieve a goal. 
The CTMS system consisted of a separate display area, which was 
dedicated to helping the pilot initiate, monitor, prioritize and terminate tasks.  From l5 
a software perspective, the CTMS employed a similar approach to TSS, using 
system and task agents. 
Following the development of the CTMS, a simulator study was performed 
to evaluate its effectiveness.  Use of the CTMS over the baseline configuration 
resulted in a reduction in misprioritization errors, response time to critical events, 
unsatisfactory aircraft control duration and the number of tasks pilots failed to 
complete. 
AgendaManager 
The AgendaManager (Funk, et aL,  1997; Funk and Braune, 1999) was a 
significant, evolutionary iteration in this line of research.  They realized that human 
pilots were no longer the only actors in the cockpit, because automation such as 
autopilots, thrust management computers, and flight management systems played a 
more active role in the control of advanced technology aircraft.  Like human actors, 
these machine actors are goal-directed systems that use complex data or knowledge 
bases to determine their behaviors. 
To incorporate the concept of machine actors, they suggested that a goal 
was achieved through a function rather than a task.  Therefore, the management of 
activities in the modern flight deck must address both human and machine 
functions.  Additionally, they identified goal conflicts between human and machine 
actors, which was another dimension of CTM that must be addressed. 
Finally, pilot intentions in the AgendaManager were captured using a 
speech recognition system to interpret the pilot's acknowledgement of ATC 
clearances. 
The evaluation of the AgendaManager was performed again in a simulated 
environment.  The baseline configuration consisted of an Engine Indicating and 
Crew Alerting System (EICAS), a system found on many commercial aircraft.  The 
results indicated that the AgendaManager performed equally well on functions it 
had in common with EICAS, but additionally improved pilot performance in the 
identification of goal conflicts and improved prioritization. 16 
Summary 
The present section has presented an evolutionary perspective on the 
facilitation of CTM.  What began as a special configuration of military avionics has 
evolved into a stand-alone pilot aiding system with the objective of helping pilots 
perform task management functions on the flight deck. 
One of the criticisms to such a pilot aid is that, on the flight deck, where 
pilot workload and attention allocation is critical, it  is effectively one more display 
(task) to which the pilot must attend.  In  other words, pilots already have periods of 
extremely high workload conditions.  During these periods, when CTM is so 
critical, a pilot aid that assists in task management functions may in fact demand 
attention from the pilot and detract him from performing those mission critical 
tasks. 
Further, the pilot aids described above are essentially nothing more than 
intelligent memory aids.  Since there is still much to learn about the nature of CTM, 
one might question if this is the best approach to realize significant gains in task 
management performance.  Only a better understanding of the task management 
process will ultimately answer this question.  Fortunately, there have been 
significant efforts toward a better understanding of CTM.  In the next section, 
works directed towards better CTM theories are presented. 
Theories of CTM 
A theory is  a collection of statements about a subject domain (Funk, 1983). 
The statement of a theory may be posed in a natural language, a purely formal 
language, such as a computer programming language, or a mathematical language, 
such as differential equations or the language of probability theory. 
The theories of CTM that have emerged over the past decade have all taken 
the form of natural language theories.  While these works have significantly added 
to the knowledge of CTM, there is still much not understood about the nature of 
CTM, especially some of the internal processes such as goal generation and task 
prioritization.  The following sections provide a summary of the theories of CTM. 17 
The Normative Theol)' ofCI'M 
The following procedure and explanation comprise a normative theory that 
was developed to help define and characterize CTM (Funk, 1991). CTM is 
described as a procedure that is executed by the night crews to manage the flight 
deck tasks as follows (See also Figure 2-2): 
I.  Create an initial agenda. 
2.  Until mission goal is achieved or determined to be unachievable: 
a.  Assess current situation. 
b.  Activate tasks whose initial events have occurred. 
c.  Assess status of active tasks. 
d.  Terminate tasks with achieved or unachievable goals. 
e.  Assess task resource requirements. 
f.  Prioritize active tasks. 
g.  Allocate resources to tasks in  order of priority. 
1.  Initiate newly activated high-priority tasks 
2.  Interrupt low-priority tasks (if necessary). 
3.  Resume interrupted tasks (when possible). 
h.  Update agenda. 18 
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Figure 2.2  The Normative Theory ofCTM (Adapted from Funk, 1991). 
Given a hierarchy of goals to accomplish during a mission, the first step for 
the flight crew is to create the initial agenda.  This agenda consists of a task to 
achieve each goal and an  initial event must be defined for each goal-task pair. 19 
Once the agenda has been established, the process of agenda management 
begins and continues until the mission goal is  achieved or has been determined 
unachievable.  In the case of the mission being determined unachievable, the 
process should end only after the aircraft and its subsystems reach some safe state. 
The night crew must assess the current situation. The states of all relevant 
aircraft systems and subsystems must be considered to determine if significant 
events have occurred. 
When initial events occur, the night crew must activate tasks that are 
contingent upon those events. This means that these tasks enter the active state and 
should become active in progress as soon as resources are available. 
The night crew must assess the status of active tasks to determine if 
satisfactory progress is being made toward achieving the tasks' goals. Not only 
must the current status of each task be assessed, but if the task's goal is not yet 
achieved, the status of the task must be projected into the future to determine the 
likelihood that the goal will be achieved. A task's status may be declared 
satisfactory if its goal is achieved or is likely to be achieved, marginal if 
achievement of its goal is uncertain, or unsatisfactory if the goal is violated or is 
unlikely to be achieved without corrective action. 
Based on this assessment, the night crew should terminate tasks with 
achieved or unachievable goals. The task goals that become irrelevant due to 
changing circumstances should also be terminated. Termination removes tasks 
from competition for resources. 
For the remaining active tasks, the flight crew should assess task resource 
requirements to determine what resources are required to complete them. A newly 
activated task might be started with minimal resources, but a task of marginal or 
unsatisfactory status might require additional resources to achieve its goal. 
The flight crew should prioritize the active tasks. Factors that might 
influence task priority include the following: 
I.  The importance and urgency of the task's goal. 
2.  The importance and urgency of other active tasks' goals. 20 
3. 	 The current and projected status of the task. 
4. 	 The current and projected statuses of other active tasks. 
Prioritization can be defined as a pairwise comparison of tasks based on 
these factors and others that result in  an ordering of active tasks. 
As a result of the previous steps. the tlight crew must then allocate 
resources to tasks in order of priority. This is an assignment of resources to tasks, 
with preference given to high-priority tasks, so that the tasks may be executed. The 
night crew should initiate newly activated high-priority tasks to make them active 
in progress. They should interrupt low-priority tasks that are active in progress 
when high-priority tasks requiring the same resources become active. When the 
high-priority tasks finish and resources become available again, the flight crew 
should resume interrupted tasks, returning them to the active in progress state. 
These steps result in a set of tasks in  the process of execution. 
This process causes changes in  the set of pending and active tasks and 
changes in task status and priority. The flight crew should update the agenda to 
reflect these changes and repeat the process. 
Strategic alld Tactical Task Management Theory 
Rogers (1996) presents a similar theory of CTM, which he calls, simply 
Task Management (TM).  He modifies and expands on Funk's normative theory 
and proposes a preliminary set of discrete night deck CTM processes based on the 
review of previous CTM analyses.  Each process is given equal weighting and it is 
assumed that there is a logical sequence, that is, each process depends on 
completion of the processes preceding it. These processes are, in order of 
occurrence: 
1. 	 Assess situation. The operational context and goals must be assessed in order to 
identify the set of tasks that need to be performed. The cockpit environment is 
dynamic and must continually be reassessed as the flight proceeds. In order to 
know what tasks need to be performed, the pilot must be aware of the phase of 
night, aircraft position, aircraft attitude and speed, aircraft and systems states, 21 
environmental conditions. unusual and other significant events, and short and 
long term goals. further. he  must he  able to project this situation knowledge 
into the future, making predictions about the course of events. 
2. 	 Identify tasks. The tasks required to achieve the goals under the current and 
anticipated circumstances of the particular flight must be identified. Also, as a 
precursor to scheduling tasks, task characteristics such as time required to 
complete, deadline, difficulty or complexity, resources required, and sequence 
interdependencies should be identified. 
3. 	 Prioritize tasks. Tasks must be prioritized in terms of urgency. This means the 
estimates of task deadlines must be compared to one another to determine 
which tasks are more urgent. Tasks must also be prioritized in terms of 
criticality, that is, how necessary are they to mission safety or success. These 
relative prioritizations, along with the task characteristics identified above, help 
in making scheduling decisions. 
4. 	 Assess resources. The availability and capability of task resources, including 
automation, other night deck personnel, company resources, and the pilot 
himself, must be determined so that assignments of tasks to those resources can 
be made appropriately. This involves determining the status and predicted 
status of each task resource and the ability of the resource to perform part or all 
of the various tasks that have to be performed. It also includes predicting the 
pilot's own workload to ensure that tasks assigned do not exceed his 
limitations. 
5. 	 Allocate resources.  Human and automation resources must be assigned to 
perform tasks. This may be a straightforward assignment, as to an autopilot or 
autothrottle, or it may require negotiation and discussion, as in deciding the 
division of duties between the crew members on the flight deck if this situation 
is not specified by procedures or regulations. The allocation process is ongoing; 
resources may need to be reassigned as conditions and goals change. Backup 
allocations should be considered, and if resources assigned to tasks are not 
completely reliable, they must be monitored. 22 
6. 	 Schedule tasks. This element involves setting an order in which the identified 
tasks should be performed. It also includes the determination of when tasks 
need to be started, delayed, temporarily stopped, or resumed. It depends not 
only on completion times, deadlines, priorities, resources, interdependencies, 
and the overall context but also, in the case of performance by humans (pilots), 
J1101llclltllln and continuity. That is, other things being equal, humans perform 
better if they can continue working on a task once they have started rather than 
switching back and forth between tasks, causing discontinuity of thought and 
action. 
7. 	 Perform tasks. This is not considered part of task management. It is included to 
explicitly distinguish between CTM and task performance. For example, if a 
call to A  TC must be performed, identifying that as a task, prioritizing it, 
scheduling it, allocating it, etc., constitute task management, but the actual call 
to A TC is a communication task, not a task management activity. 
8. 	 Monitor tasks.  Task performance should be monitored relative to the schedule 
to assure that tasks are started on time, completed on time, and are progressing 
as expected.  Bottlenecks and resource limitations should be identified.  Ifthe 
tasks are not progressing towards completion as expected, then the pilot should 
consider ways to hurry, delay, or modify task performance in order to meet the 
schedule.  The schedule, the overall situation, or the tasks to be performed may 
need to be re-evaluated. 
9. 	 Manage interruptions.  In real-time environments such as commercial flight, 
interruptions will occur as tasks are being performed.  If an interruption is 
processed, then attention to the ongoing task may be, at least momentarily, 
suspended.  Often the interruption, such as a call from A TC, can signal the 
requirement to perform a new task, such as reporting position, or changing 
heading.  These interruptions must be managed - the pilot must determine 
whether to stop the current task to process the interruption, and whether to 
immediately go back to the current task or to perform a new task if one is 
associated with the interruption.  Further, the pilot must remember at what stage 23 
the first task was stopped so thm it can be efficiently resumed, and if the 
interruption changes overall goals or tasks, the need to continue, terminate or 
modify ongoing tasks must be assessed. 
In addition to the refined theory of normative CTM presented above, 
Rogers draws three conclusions that appear to be very useful and relevant to 
identifying the nature of CTM: 
1. 	 Strategic and Tactical CTM.  There is a very pronounced dichotomy in CTM: 
strategic CTM and tactical CTM.  Strategic CTM is characterized by pre­
planning activities, building a mental model, monitoring, contingency planning, 
filling gaps with continuous and pre-planned items, and performing tasks early 
to avoid real and potential workload bottlenecks later.  These properties were 
used to describe CTM activities when the flight is proceeding normally and 
there is little or no time pressure.  However, tactical CTM is characterized by 
dividing tasks (between crew members), using a well-learned, well-rehearsed 
mental list of discrete items to be performed, doing time-critical, high priority 
items, operating in "real time," hurrying the pace of tasks, and deferring or 
dropping tasks.  Rogers used these properties to describe CTM activities when 
there was an emergency or time-pressured situation. 
2. 	 CTM is time-driven.  The overriding explicit CTM process is scheduling or 
ordering tasks.  The ordering is primarily related to the task's urgency.  Tactical 
CTM is  immediate event-driven and strategic CTM is workload-management 
dnven. 
3. 	 Categorization of tasks.  Tasks are divided into discrete real time tasks, discrete 
pre-planned tasks, and continuous or repetitive tasks.  Discrete tasks are ordered 
along a priority or time dimension and continuous tasks are interleaved with 
discrete tasks but not explicitly ordered. 
Rogers' work identifies and emphasizes two very important aspects of 
CTM.  First, although Funk's normative theory implicitly gives equal weighting to 
all CTM processes, Rogers suggests it was the scheduling and ordering of tasks that 
was the dominant process.  Second, the prioritization of tasks was dependent upon 24 
the characteristics of the task context.  In other words, prioritization in a tactical 
phase of flight differs from prioritization in  a strategic phase. 
Personal Workload Management Strategy )Js.  MOllitorillg Strategy 
Schutte and Trujillo (1996) performed a study where pilots flew a simulator 
in a primarily tactical CTM mode, where several critical system faults resulted in 
the need for the pilots to alter the flight plan and land at an alternate location. 
They propose that CTM contains two distinct activities: personal workload 
management and monitoring of the current situation.  The monitoring activity 
comprises the 'assess current situation' and 'assess progress and status of active 
tasks' of Funk's (1991) normative theory. 
Each of these two activities itself can have one of four differing strategies 
depending on the individual characteristics of a pilot: 
1. 	 Aviate-Navigate-Communicate-Manage Systems (ANCS). The conceptual 
basis of the ANCS rask hierarchy is that rhe preceding task category takes 
priority over subsequent category.  In other words, aviate tasks always have a 
higher priority than the navigate tasks, which have a higher priority than the 
communicate tasks, and so on.  This is a general prioritization scheme common 
in the research environment and very well known to pilots.  However, it is not 
difficult to conceptualize situations in which this prioritization scheme breaks 
down and the tasks take on a priority inconsistent with the ANCS hierarchy.  In 
a strict ANCS prioritization approach. task prioritization occurs with little 
regard for the context of the situation. 
2. 	 Perceived Severity. Subjects place the highest priority on what they perceive to 
be the most threatening problem. 
3. 	 Procedure Based. Subjects migrate towards tasks for which there are well­
defined procedures.  These range from systems procedures to Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FARs). 
4. 	 Event/Interrupt (ElI) Driven. Subjects' attention is given to a particular task 
based on an event or an interruption.  They will typically continue pursuing that 25 
task until the task is completed, the subject can do no more on the task or until 
another event or interruption disrupts the task. 
The results of the simulator study suggests the pilots use, to some extent, 
each of these four strategies.  However, the performance of the pilots was not 
equivalent.  The authors identified the strategies that resulted in the most effective 
pilot performance (fewest errors and fastest response times).  For the personal 
workload management activity, they found that the Perceived severity strategy 
resulted in the best pilot performance.  For the Monitoring activity, the ANCS 
strategy proved most effective. 
Their interpretation of their findings is  also very interesting.  First, they 
suggest that CTM is  largely dependent on individual differences between flight 
crews and personal style.  Second, the activity of CTM appears to playa significant 
role in how the flight crew deals with a non-normal situation.  In the study, 
different strategies resulted in different outcomes to the flight scenario.  Third, 
interruptions playa significant part in the CTM of pilots, many of which are due to 
communication requests from A  TC.  They conclude that explicit training for 
normative CTM strategies should be incorporated into flight crew training. 
Summary 
The current effort has been a summary of past research efforts directed 
towards CTM.  It has covered the definition of a CTM language and the 
development of error taxonomies used to identify and classify task management­
related errors.  Several studies examined various reports and found that CTM errors 
were present in incidents, accidents and a part task simulator study.  Efforts were 
made towards the reduction of CTM errors through CTM facilitation, where pilot 
aids are used to display and integrate status information from multiple sources. 
These agent-based aids showed promising results in helping pilots better manage 
multiple tasks.  Other researchers used varying methods to further develop and 
refine CTM theory, giving new insights into how pilots prioritize tasks.  In general, 26 
the one conclusion that can be drawn from the existing CTM research is this: CTM 
is significant to system safety and system effectiveness. 
However, it  is still evident that the theories are still somewhat vague and 
many questions about CTM errors continue to go unanswered. There is still much 
to bc accomplished in the area of CTM.  The approach taken in thIs arca to date has 
been from a very operational or ecologically valid perspective.  At a very 
fundamental level, task management is essentially the control of altentional focus 
and the proper allocation of attention (and other resources) to the tasks on the flight 
deck.  One possible opportunity for further developments in the theory of CTM lies 
in a better understanding of how the pilot's attention is controlled.  Does the pilot 
consciously perform attentional control, or does the task environment determine 
where attention is focused?  In other words, is attentional focus internally or 
externally controlled?  In  the next chapter, CTM is approached from a more 
fundamental perspective with the intention of working towards a better 
understanding of the task management process. 27 
CHAPTER 3: 

COCKPIT TASK MANAGEMENT: TOWARDS A BETTER 

UNDERSTANDING 

A Human Performance Approach 
The Engineering (or Systems) Approach 
The existing research to date has approached Cockpit Task Management 
(CTM) from a systems-based perspective.  In other words, it has identified and 
discussed the inputs, outputs and states of the task management process, but has 
done so without looking deeply into the process itself.  While this approach has 
made significant progress in the characterization of CTM, there may exist 
opportunities to discover a deeper understanding of the task management process. 
The Human Performance Approach 
The present chapter takes an alternative approach: The examination of CTM 
from a human performance perspective.  CTM was investigated according to 
human behavioral dimensions that appeared to be closely related to the task 
management process.  The source of much of the following discussion comes from 
a review of research that was performed in the applied and cognitive psychology 
domains.  While systems-based and engineering research often criticizes 
psychological experiments for the use of abstract, simple tasks or experiments that 
lack ecological validity, the very specific nature of this type of research may 
provide new, fresh insights into the nature of CTM.  It is hypothesized that the 
exploration of the human performance characteristics of task management may lead 
to better research in the more ecologically valid environment of the engineering 
research approach to CTM. 28 
The Context of CTM 
The CTAI Continuum: Internal vs.  External behaviors 
In the complex, multiple task environment of the flight deck, CTM can be 
conceptualized to lie on a continuum of internal and external behaviors.  Figure 3.1 
identifies 8 research concepts related to CTM.  The items to the right of center have 
been investigated using an engineering approach directly related to CTM, while the 
items to the left of center are the focus of the current chapter. 
Focus of Current Efforts  Previous Research Efforts ------] 
Implicit Behavior  CTM  Explicit Behavior 
Human Performance  Engineering (Systems) 

Approach  Approach 

Figure 3.1  The Cockpit Task Management Continuum. 
While the external behaviors are readily accessible through direct 
performance measurement, the internal behaviors present a significant 
methodological problem, as it is very difficult to measure and quantify such 
activities.  The existing CTM literature has focused on these external 
characteristics, but has not yet explored the internal characteristics.  While there is 29 
some discussion of these internal behaviors from other research areas, the present 
effort appears to be the first attempt to apply such concepts to CTM. 
These internal behaviors occur within the mind.  They include processes, 
such as dynamic attentional control, that are concerned with the moment-by­
moment adjustment of behavioral goal priorities, with the planning and sequencing 
of behavior, and with the maintenance and/or shifting of a selective task set.  While 
these processes provide some of the most challenging and interesting research 
questions, they have attracted relatively little research over the last 25 years, even 
in the areas of experimental and cognitive psychology (Allport, 1992). 
Automation ofBehavior 
Automation of Task Performance 
Continued practice in a multiple task environment will eventually lead to 
improved task performance.  There are at least two possible reasons for the 
improvement.  First, it may be that humans are able to develop very exacting 
control over the allocation of their limited resources to perform the tasks.  In other 
words, the allocation of resources can be performed at near optimal levels, where 
each effort contributes to attaining the current goals.  This executi  ve control of 
attention is the topic of a subsequent section. 
However, it has been well established that continued practice on a single 
task will improve performance (Wickens, 1992).  Therefore, in multiple task 
environments, continued practice on each of the tasks may lead to better overall 
performance of all the tasks.  This improvement in task performance with practice 
is called the automatization of a task, and is a fundamental dimension of human 
performance. 
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) suggested this classification of task 
performance into a controlled-automatic processing continuum.  Controlled 
processing (CP) is characterized as a slow, generally serial, effortful, capacity­
limited processing mode that must be used to deal with novel or inconsistent 30 
information.  Automatic processing CAP), on the other hand, is a fast, parallel, fairly 
effortless process that is  not limited by short-term memory capacity, is  not under 
direct subject control, and is  responsible for the high performance of well­
developed skilled behaviors. 
There are four stages in  the transformation of tasks from controlled to 
automatic mode (Schneider and Shiffrin. 1977): 
1. 	 Pure controlled processing. Memory load negatively affects performance. 
2. 	 Flattening of the memory load curve. A result of practice, both controlled and 
automatic processing occur. 
3. 	 Nearly automatic processing. Automatic processing, but attention is allocated to 
assist automatic processing. 
4. 	 Pure automatic processing. No attention is allocated to the automated task, so 
concurrent attention-demanding tasks will not degrade automated task 
performance. 
AP typically develops when an individual processes stimuli consistently 
over many trials. Some of the critical characteristics of automatic processing are the 
ability of the individual to shift from serial to parallel processing, a reduction in 
workload, a reduction in processing control, and a dramatic reduction in the ability 
to learn during automatic processing (Damos, 1991). 
As a single task is learned and practiced, it moves from CP mode towards 
AP mode, and its demand on information processing resources is decreased.  The 
task can be performed with less effort and with less attention paid to the task.  The 
same can be said for the multiple task environment.  As multiple tasks are 
practiced, they become more automated, and require less attention and performance 
improves.  This form of improvement does not actually result from acquisition of 
an attentional control or time-sharing skill, but from a reduced resource demand of 
each individual task (Wickens, 1992). 31 
Relevance to CTM 
The previous section docllments improved task performance on the 
execution of tasks due to the effects of practice and automatization of the tasks. 
While the literature has not come to a final conclusion if this is  the fundamental 
cause of improved multiple task performance, there is  strong evidence that 
automatization of tasks does improve mUltiple task performance.  However, is the 
ultimate objective to train the pilot so extensively that all tasks are performed in AP 
mode?  Is  it possible?  Is this desirable? Does it really free resources so additional 
tasks can be performed? 
In their study of controlled and automatic processes, Schneider and Fisk 
(1982) reported that under time-sharing conditions, task elements that were 
automated after prolonged training still captured attention, although controlled 
attention was not required to assure performance.  Dedicated training efforts were 
needed to teach subjects to relax and release attention.  This is an indication 
subjects were unable to voluntarily control the allocation of their attentional 
resources, and significant automatization did not lead to improved multiple task 
performance. 
Additionally, the natures of some tasks on the flight desk are not good 
candidates for automatization.  Norman (1988) discusses capture errors, in which a 
frequently performed behavior suddenly takes over instead of the behavior 
intended.  For example, a primary task on the flight desk is communication with 
ATC  Much of this communication involves the interpretation of verbal clearances, 
which establish the goals for subsequent tasks.  While these clearances are often 
very consistent from flight to flight, there is  no guarantee and the clearances do 
change significantly from flight to flight.  In an incident report (NASA, 1992), a 
pilot was given a clearance to descend to 3500'.  However, this clearance was 
inconsistent with his past experiences of the situation as an altitude of 3000' was 
usual! y designated for the particular flight.  Therefore, even though the A  TC 
clearance of 3500' was clearly audible and perceived by the pilot, a capture error 
was committed and he interpreted the clearance to be 3000'.  While the air traffic 32 
controller in  this situation was operating within federal regulations, the 
automatization of the pilot's behavior of this simple communicate task resulted in a 
sItuation that could have easily resulted in a very unsafe condition (e.g., a midair 
collision).  For some tasks on the flightdeck, it  is surely desirable that they be 
performed in a CP mode, for the potential improvements in task performance due 
to AP are far outweighed by the potential consequences of a capture error in such 
situations. 
In high workload situations, pilots do need to have tasks, to a large extent, 
in AP mode.  According to Chou's (1991) findings, as workload increases, CTM 
errors increase.  Therefore, if some tasks can be performed in AP mode, it may 
release some cognitive resources, allowing the pilot to manage multiple tasks. 
Current training techniques, where pilots practice procedures through many 
repetitions, supports this concept.  Pilots, in general, are very well trained on 
normal procedures, such as aircraft control and normal checklists.  However, one of 
the human's very unique and desirable characteristics is to deal with novel 
situations, where behavior will occur in a CP mode.  Therefore, it is  not even 
desirable to have a pilot perform entirely in AP mode.  Additionally, AP opens the 
door for capture errors and in reality, some tasks just don't lend themselves to AP 
mode (e.g., ATC communications).  Therefore, total automatization of behavior is 
not the answer. 
Voluntary Control ofAttention 
Evidence of Control 
Can humans voluntarily control where attention and other resources are 
allocated?  As one reads this paragraph, what if a fire alarm was to sound? Would 
the reader switch attention from the page to the alarm? The author would suggest 
that the reader would, at least momentarily. switch attention from the page to the 
aural alarm.  With training and practice, would the reader be able to ignore the 33 
ongoing alarm and continue to attend to the paragraph being read?  The literature 
suggests the answer is  yes (Gopher, 1992). 
Although attention control has rarely been a direct topic of research, several 
series of studies support the claim that humans can actively control attention.  For 
example, Posner, Snyder, and Davidson (1980) suggest humans are able to adopt a 
selective set of stimuli to which to attend.  Data that documents the successful 
division of attention comes primarily from experiments with the dual-task 
paradigm (Gopher and Donchin, 1986).  One line of studies has documented 
consistent individual differences in  attention-switching capabilities as a factor 
distinguishing between good and bad performers of complex tasks (Gopher, 1982; 
Gopher and Kahneman, 1971; North and Gopher, 1976). This evidence supports 
the ability of subjects to adopt and successfully apply graded levels of attention 
allocated to a task. 
In the operational flight deck environment, a pilot would benefit most if he 
could fully attend and respond to all elements of all tasks at all times.  However, 
such full attention is not possible.  In fact, though we may be able to apparently 
perform several tasks at once, we can devote thoughtful, conscious attention to only 
one at a time (Adams and Pew, 1990; Adams, et aI.,  1991).  Therefore, some 
compromises and priorities must be established along with attention-allocation 
strategies.  Setting priorities in a task environment is a common behavior, but the 
question is how efficient are humans in establishing allocation strategies, especially 
in a complex, multiple task environment such as the flight deck? 
With few exceptions (e.g., Logan, 1985; Allport, 1992), strategic control of 
attention in operational environments has never been a major topic of research in 
experimental psychology.  Gopher (1992) suggests that a strategy, in this context, 
is defined as a vector of differential weights or attention biases assigned to tasks.  It 
influences the performer's behaviors with respect to the requirements of the task. 
A strategy represents the solution implemented by the performer to achieve 
performance objectives, within the boundaries of his processing and response 
limitations.  In other words, selection of an attention allocation strategy is an 34 
evaluation of a vector of factors, with the prioritization of multiple tasks being the 
result.  It is  not clear, however, if this evaluation is an explicit, conscious cognitive 
function.  On the contrary, it may be a function that is performed subconsciously by 
the pilot. 
But what is  the underlying nature of such strategies?  One popular view 
attributes all such control processes to a unitary central executive or supervisory 
attention system (SAS) (Baddeley, 1986; Norman and Shallice 1986). 
Unfortunately, according to at least one scientist (Allport, 1992) the concept of a 
central executive has yet to be elaborated in a way that avoids the homunculus 
problem. 
Allport (1992) suggests that there is little evidence of such a unitary (and 
simple) theory of attention.  One fault with such a theory is the assumption that 
attentional functions were all of one type.  Rather, he suggests the idea that 
attentional functions are of a very many different kinds, serving a great range of 
different computational purposes.  There can be no simple theory of attention, any 
more than there can be a simple theory of cognition.  In other words, the nature of 
attention allocation in a multiple task environment is complex, and depends upon 
such factors as the nature of the task and the training, experience and abilities of the 
performer.  However, identification of these factors has not yet been accomplished. 
Evidence of Failure of Control 
In addition to positive evidence of attentional control abilities, there is 
evidence of problems, failures, and limitations. 
Gopher and Donchin (1986) found a degradation of primary task 
performance when a secondary task was introduced, despite clear instruction to 
protect the performance of the primary task.  Traditionally, this decrement in 
primary task performance has been attributed to capacity overload.  However, 
Gopher (1992) suggests that it may be more a lack of attentional control on the part 
of the subject.  Subjects may not be able to correctly allocate only spare capacity to 
the secondary task, thus protecting the primary task.  Gopher suggests the subjects . 
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do not have adequate knowledge about the attention costs of performing each of the 
tasks. 
While researchers have been able to document graded levels of performance 
on tasks, this was only accomplished with the use of augmented feedback (Navon 
and Gopher,  J979; Gopher, Bricker, and Navon, 1982).  In  other words, subjects 
could perform tasks at several different levels of performance, but they required 
special, on-line, augmented feedback displaying the consequences of emphasis 
changes on their performance to do so successfully.  Without such feedback, 
subjects were unable to perform multilevel adjustments (Spitz 1988). 
Gopher (1982) and Spitz (1988) found that in many dual-task situations, 
subjects had as much difficulty lowering their standard of performance for the task 
for which priority was reduced as they had in improving performance for the task 
on which priority was increased.  It appears that subjects have difficulties lowering 
performance and reducing efforts on one task.  They cannot easily release resources 
for the performance of another high-priority task, while still maintaining minimal 
control over the low-priority task. 
Therefore, even though there is strong evidence that humans are able to 
voluntarily control attention, in all three types of failures of control presented 
above, the nature of difficulty appear to stem from subjects' lack of ability to 
efficiently control the allocation of their attentional resources. 
Relevance to CTM 
To date, the CTM theory has suggested that task management is the 
explicit, serial process in  Figure 3-2 (Funk, 1991).  Rather, CTM may be an 
exercise in the control of attention and proper allocation of resources to tasks. 
Further, the CTM errors that have been identified (Chou, et aI.,  1996) may be a 
result of the lack of attentional control and the inability to efficiently allocate 
resources properly. 
The human performance literature suggests two opportunities for the 
improvement of attention control.  First, Gopher (1992) has found extensive 
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evidence that the effect of "variable priority" training not only improves 
performance of individual tasks, but more importantly, it improves the efficiency 
with which subjects allocate resources.  In other words, the technique develops 
executive control to improve the efficiency with which attention is allocated to 
competing tasks. 
Secondly, past research (Navon and Gopher, 1979: Gopher, Bricker, and 
Navon, 1982) suggests that augmented system feedback has a significant effect on 
the subject's ability to change attention allocation strategies.  This is supportive 
evidence of past CTM facilitation efforts by Funk and his colleagues (Chou, et aI., 
1996).  While continued pursuit in this area could bring about integrative flight 
deck systems that could better aid the pilot in the proper allocation of attention to 
tasks, the fact remains that there still exists limited knowledge of the CTM process. 
The first step is to better understand how CTM functions, and more specifically, 
how task prioritization is accomplished. 
Time-Sharing Ability 
Human time-sharing skill is knowing when to sample what from all 
available information sources, when to make which response, and how to integrate 
better the flow of information in multiple, concurrent tasks (Wickens, 1992).  It is 
suggested that humans incorporate the performance improving effects of the 
automatization of tasks and the attentional control abilities presented in the 
previous sections to better perform multiple tasks in an operational environment. 
Switching attention from one task to another is an aspect of voluntary 
control that has been widely employed in the study of attentionallimitations 
(Gopher, 1992).  The main interest in most studies has not been in the properties 
and control of switching, but rather in contrasting serial and parallel models of the 
human processing system.  Several studies have documented consistent individual 
differences in attention-switching capabilities as a factor distinguishing between 
good and bad performance of complex tasks  (e.g., Braune, 1986; Gopher, 1982). 37 
When observing the expert perform multiple, complex tasks, such as !lying 
an aircraft, the novice is  often amazed at the case with which the expert can 
effectively time-share a number of separate activities.  However, as the novice 
gains experience, he too is  able to perform multiple, concurrent tasks at an 
acceptable level of performance.  But is the improvement in performance due to the 
development of a specific time-sharing ability, or merely just more practice with 
each individual task? 
There is evidence of a general time-sharing ability (Damos, and Wickens, 
1980; Gopher, 1992).  It was shown that training this ability with one set of tasks 
was generalizable to other tasks.  However, what was concluded was that very 
efficient time-sharing performance of the expert results not only from the true skill 
of time-sharing, but also from the development more automated behavior on the 
individual tasks.  This conclusion, then, adds another dimension to the management 
of multiple, concurrent tasks. 
Sll1llmary 
The purpose of the preceding sections was to explore alternative approaches 
to studying CTM and establish future directions.  In this approach, CTM is 
considered from the perspective of human performance related to the 
automatization of task performance, the voluntary control of attention and human 
time-sharing ability.  It was not the intention to fully explore each of these concepts 
in their own contexts, but rather to provide a general perspective to discuss the 
nature of CTM. 
The CTM theories discussed in Chapter 2 fail to incorporate the human 
performance characteristics of multiple task performance discussed above. 
Specifically, the characteristics of Funk's normative theory (Figure 2.2) that 
assesses task resource requirements, determines ifa resource conflict exists, and 
prioritizes tasks, do not elaborate on how human abilities are able perform such 
functions. 38 
With respect to assessing task resource requirements, the automaticity of 
the task must be considered.  Some tasks, such as primary aircraft control and 
sequential tasks, such as  normal checklists, can be performed largely in AP mode. 
However, there are some tasks on the flight deck that arc not good candidates for 
automatization (i.e., interpretation of ATC clearances).  Further, the existence of a 
resource cOllflict may depend upon the automaticity of a particular task to a 
particular pilot.  Pilots with many thousands of hours in a particular model of 
aircraft may be able to perform common tasks in AP mode while also 
communicating with ATe.  However, other pilots may not have developed such 
efficient automatic behaviors on the same common tasks, thus they are not able to 
equal the expert performance of the well-practiced pilot. 
Existing theories of CTM treat the prioritization oftasks as a simple queue 
of tasks to be completed.  However, in the context of the flight deck, tasks are 
performed in a complex time-sharing mode, where attentional focus engages a task 
for a short period, switches to another task, then may again return to the original 
task.  It is in this area that human abilities to voluntarily control attention and 
effectively time share between tasks becomes important for a deeper understanding 
of the management of multiple tasks.  In the following section, a primary research 
question is extracted from the approach described above, which will be the focus of 
the subsequent chapters. 
Research Question 
One of the topics of multiple task performance that continually arises in 
both the CTM and human performance literature is that of the prioritization of 
tasks.  An initial assumption can be made that tasks are performed in the order of 
priority assigned to them by the person performing the tasks.  However, due to the 
very dynamic nature of tasks on the flight deck, this assumption may not always 
hold true (i.e., by the time the first task is complete, the situation has changed and 
new priorities exist), but for purposes of this research, it is considered a satisfactory 39 
approximation.  Then the question can be phrased: What determines the order in 
which tasks arc performed? 
Gopher (1992) postulates that attention strategies can be defined as vectors 
of factors that combine performance objectives for elements of complex tasks, in 
the service of a higher-level goal to establish driving forces of attention allocation. 
This suggestion may provide a framework with which to describe the process of 
task prioritization.  However, Gopher admits that even if this view is accepted, 
there is still a lack of knowledge about the factors and mechanisms that represent 
strategies and about the forces that drive them. 
Logan (1985) suggest two factors, cue validity and resource requirements, 
that affect task prioritization, but he asks what other factors determine how humans 
allocate attentional strategies to mUltiple tasks. 
Adams and Pew (1990) suggest a more specific approach to prioritization in 
the context of multiple task management: 
Though we may be able to do several things at once, we can 
devote thoughtful, conscious attention to only one at a time. 
The implications are,  first,  that the management of multiple 
cognitively  complex  tasks  must  consist  essentially  in 
working  on  one  while  queuing  some  number  of  others. 
Second, the queue of to-be-attended tasks cannot be worked 
through  any simple first-in  first-out  heuristic.  Instead,  the 
tasks in the queue must be prioritized with deference to both 
the  temporal  requirements  on  their  execution  and  their 
overall importance to  the management of the situation as  a 
whole.  Within actual systems, moreover, the nominal set of 
tasks in  the queue as  well as  their relative priorities change 
dynamically as  a  function  of events  and of changes in  the 
status  of the  subsystems  involved.  Grappling  with  these 
issues  is  forcing  us  to  recognize a  variety of questions that 
are in dire need of research. 
Yet  the  queue  cannot  be  productively  conceived  as  a  list: 
Like  the  tokens  in  explicit  focus,  those  in  the  queue must 
correspond to pointers to knowledge structures in memory ­
structures  that  detail  the  procedural  and  declarative 40 
knowledge about each task and that  must be accessed in  its 
prioritization, reprioritization, scheduling, and execution. 
Because,  more  than  anything  else,  it  may  be  maintenance 
and  prioritization  of  this  queue  that  must  determine  the 
pilot's  capacity  to  respond  appropriately  to  the  individual 
demands of the scenario, it  is  worth examining its cognitive 
requirements  more  closely.  For  purposes  of  discussion, 
these requirements can be divided into two (nonindependent) 
subsets:  (I) How does the pilot prioritize the pending tasks? 
And (2) What are the factors  that determine when she or he 
will shift attention to any particular task in the queue? 
The question, then, is quite clear: 
What are the factors that affect task prioritization? 
The references cited above all suggest that there are factors that affect task 
prioritization, but for the most part, fail to predict what these factors might be. 
The CTM literature has posed several predications on the factors, however 
there exists little empirical evidence to support the presence of these factors in a 
complex environment such as the flight deck.  Table 3.1 is a compilation of 13 
factors that may affect task priontization (Funk, et aI.,  1998; Pashler, 1998; Schutte 
and Trujillo, ] 996; Rogers, 1996). 
The literature suggests that identification of the factors that affect task 
prioritization is a topic lacking in research efforts.  However. from the citations 
above, several individuals agree the investigation of these factors is worth pursuing. 
Since CTM is concerned primarily with human performance in the context of the 
commercia] aircraft flight deck, this is a logical next step in the investigation of 
CTM.  Therefore, the present CTM research effort is directed towards investigating 
these prioritization factors.  Stated very simply, the question posed in the present 
research is: 
What are the factors that affect task prioritization in the operational 
cOlltext ofthe flight deck? 41 
I  Advance knowledge of upcoming tasks - task> arc performed early to reduce workload during very 
busy period.s 
:2  Discriminahility of task-related stimuli - the tasks with saliellt stimuli arc gi\'cn high priority 
-'  Differences in le\'el of effort requil'ed to process task-related stimuli - an c\ aluation of the erfort 
required to pillcess infonmtion is  performed, and prioritizatioll is affected by  the rcsult of the cvaluation 
4 	Temporal proximity of task-related stimuli - tasks related to reccntly sampled stimuli are given high 

priority 

'i Task impOl'tance: aviate> navigate> communication> manage systems - tasks arc performed 
strictly in  accordance with their classification in  the ANCS taxonomy. without regard to current context 
6  Perceived UI'gency of task - the time to complete the task is compared to the time remaining until the 
task must he complete and the task with the least difference is  given high priority 
7 	Task difficulty - the difliculty of performing the task is evaluated and prioritization is affected hy the 

result of the evaluation 

X Task proficiency - the level of automaticity of a task affects the prioritization 
')  Task recency - tasks that  were performed recently arc given high priority 
10  Task momentum - the tendency to  continue to perform the current task affects task priority 
II Task proximity to completion - the continuation of a task that is  nearly complete is given high priority 
12  Amount (If efrOl't already invested in tasks - tasks that have already received conSiderable efforts arc 
given high priority 
13  Perceived task status - the status of a task IS evaluated for its status (satisfactory/unsatisfactory) and the 
result affects prioritization 
Table 3,1  Prediction of Factors that May Affect Task Prioritization, 42 
CHAPTER 4: 

INITIAL IDENTIFICATION OF FACTORS THAT AFFECT TASK 

PRIORITIZA  TION ON THE FLIGHT DECK 

Introduction 
Over the past decade, cockpit task management (CTM) has been isolated as 
a cognitive function that is  intuitively well understood by pilots and almost always 
performed satisfactorily.  However, there are documented accounts where tasks 
were not managed properly, resulting in an incident or accident (Chou et aI.,  1996). 
A very vivid example of improper CTM can be drawn from the  1972 Eastern 
Airlines accident in Miami, Florida, where the failure of a gear-down lamp 
ultimately engrossed the full attention of 3 pilots who failed to respond to an 
autopilot disengagement.  The aircraft descended into the ground, killing 99 people 
on board (NTSB, 1973).  Other CTM error examples can be found in Chou (1991) 
and Madhavan (1993). 
Task prioritization, in the context of the flight deck, is defined as the proper 
allocation of attentional resources to tasks in order to achieve subgoals which 
support the overall mission goal.  In other words, proper task prioritization ensures 
the pilot is "doing what he should be doing." A CTM prioritization error occurs 
when attentional resources are allocated to a task with a lower priority at the 
expense of another, higher priority task.  Funk (1991) identified several categories 
of CTM errors.  One of those error types, improper task prioritization, has been 
shown to be significantly present in both aircraft accidents and incidents (Chou, et 
al.  1996). 
Of the existing work that has been done in the area of task management, 
none have addressed task prioritization exclusively.  Stated very simply, this part of 
the study attempted to identify which factors pilots use to determine task priority, 
and ultimately, what task they will allocate their attention towards.  For a 
comprehensive background of CTM and related topics, see Chapter 2. 43 
In this experiment, pilots new arrival procedures in  a part-task simulator. 
Two knowledge elicitation techniques were used to probe the subjects for factors 
that innuenced their attentional prioritization scheme while performing multiple, 
concurrent flight deck tasks. 
Kllowledge Elicitation Techniques 
There are two primary challenges with studying task prioritization or 
attention allocation strategies.  First, it is very difficult to determine what pilots are 
attending to at any particular instant.  It is accepted that the location of eye focus is 
often a good indication of where one's attention is focused at a particular time. 
This is especially true in an environment such as the flight deck, where much of the 
task-related information is obtained visually.  However, it is also very evident that 
this is  not always the case.  A pilot can be looking at a display, but truly be thinking 
about something totally unrelated to the display.  This situation may occur quite 
often, and it is extremely difficult to determine from the external perspective of an 
experimenter. 
Secondly, if we were able to satisfactorily determine to what the pilot was 
attending, the next challenge is to determine Why.  In other words, how does the 
task prioritization process work?  Is it an internally-driven process, where the pilot 
uses all past experiences as a knowledge base to implicitly prioritize tasks, or is it a 
process driven by the environment, where a pilot merely reacts to events as they 
occur on the flight deck? 
Task prioritization and attention allocation may very well be an internal, 
implicit process that is  not directly accessible through any known measurement 
equipment or techniques (Adams, et aI.,  1991).  The approach in this part of the 
study was to use knowledge elicitation techniques to verbally probe pilots as to 
what factors influence their task prioritization while flying. 
The literature documents tens of knowledge elicitation techniques, each 
having advantages and disadvantages depending on the particular task environment 
(Salter,  1988; Cooke, 1994).  Often, the recommendations are to use multiple 44 
techniques in order to emphasize each technique's strengths and minimize its 
weaknesses.  In general, each technique varies in its requirements.  Some 
techniques are best implemented in a natural environment, while others are best 
used in  a laboratory setting. 
Another concern with knowledge elicitation techniques is the intrusiveness 
of the method: how much the technique disturbs normal task performance.  The 
more intrusive a technique is, the more difficult it will be to use in an actual 
operational setting and the more it may disturb the very nature of the task being 
performed.  This may result in the acquisition of knowledge that is not entirely 
representative of true task performance. 
A fundamental characteristic of elicitation techniques is that of ecological 
validity: the measure of how much a task is like the actual task of interest.  Actual 
task performance is clearly the most ecologically valid environment, and the data 
generated in that setting will be a very good sample of true task performance. 
However, thorough investigation of true task performance is not always possible, 
especially in an environment such as the piloting of an aircraft, where Federal 
A  viation Administration (FAA) regulations are but the first hurdle to data 
collection on the flight deck.  Additionally, the complexity of the operational 
setting, the very aspect that gives task performance its ecological validity, often 
makes it difficult to isolate the relevant behaviors and knowledge.  This tradeoff is 
inherent: the more ecologically valid the task setting, the more complex; the more 
complex, the more both data and noise are generated and collected; the more data 
and noise, the more difficult to separate them, and to focus on the questions of 
interest.  On the other hand, in a simplified simulation environment, with a well­
defined task and goal structure, performance data can be carefully and accurately 
collected.  However, this same isolation may so transform the task that the 
knowledge used in this environment may significantly differ from that used in the 
true operational environment. 
In the present study, two elicitation techniques were used: retrospective 
comment analysis (referred to here as the "retrospective" technique) and 4S 
interruption analysis (the "intruslve" technique).  These techniques were chosen for 
their strengths, their practicality of use and their compatibility with the equipment 
available for the present research. 
In the retrospective technique, task performance is  recorded as it occurs 
naturally, then reviewed for analysis with the subject.  This is usually performed 
with the use of videotaping equipment, allowing for the subject to be placed back 
into the context of the task environment as much as possible. 
One of the advantages of the retrospective technique is the ecologically 
valid data that can be collected, as  tasks can be performed with little or no 
intrusion.  However, the shortcomings of this technique include the possibly limited 
ability of the subject to remember and interpret behaviors after the situation has 
passed.  The retrospective technique is best for explicit knowledge elicitation, 
however in certain circumstances, this technique can allow the subject to observe 
the application of his implicit knowledge and perhaps verbalize this implicit 
knowledge. 
In this experimental study, the retrospective interview was employed with 
the aid of a videotaping system.  The pilot performed an entire flight scenario while 
being videotaped.  The videotape was a picture-in-a-picture configuration, where 
upon review, the pilot and experimenter could review both the instruments of the 
simulator and the body movements of the pilot.  At predetermined situations in the 
scenario, the videotape was stopped, and the pilot probed for task prioritization 
information (see the cognitive interview section below for a description of the 
probing technique). 
The intrusive technique involves observing the subject performing the 
actual task, and then interrupting the subject during actual task performance and 
probing about aspects of what has just occurred.  While this method can be applied 
in a highly ecologically valid task environment, the task must lend itself to being 
interruptible.  Thus in aviation research, for obvious reasons, such a method could 
never be applied in actual flight conditions, but is limited to flight simulators. 
Additionally, it is  important to recognize that once task performance has been 46 
interrupted, the task environment has changed, so this method may not accurately 
obtain data of the behaviors of interest.  Often, because of the intrusive 
characteristic of this method, it  is  used to focus on one aspect of task performance 
at a time. 
In the intrusive technique used in this study, the pilot again performed a 
flight scenario on the simulator.  However, at predetermined points in the flight 
scenario, the simulator was stopped, and the pilot was probed immediately. 
Following the interview, the flight scenario was again resumed until the next probe. 
The justification of selecting these two techniques for this study is three­
fold.  First, because the current study was an initial investigation of task 
prioritization, it was in the hypothesis generation phase.  Due to the nature of the 
free dialog during both the retrospective and intrusive interviews, the data tends to 
be extensive and at a relatively high level of detail suited for hypothesis generation. 
Second, if the intrusive technique was found to be too disruptive to the task 
environment, there would still be a significant amount of data collected during the 
retrospective interviews to be useful.  Alternately, if the retrospective technique 
was found to elicit lower quality data, then the data collected using the intrusive 
technique could still be useful.  Finally, one of the questions posed in the current 
study was a determination if there was any difference in the data collected using the 
two techniques, as it is anticipated that follow on studies will be performed using 
one or both of these techniques. 
The Cognitive Illterview 
As described above, the interviewing opportunities in this experiment were 
determined by either the intrusive or retrospective elicitation techniques.  However, 
once the probe was initiated, the actual form of the questioning was consistent 
between the two methods.  The cognitive interviewing technique formed the basis 
of the probe questions during each of the interviews. 
Many interviewing techniques are based on the structured interview, where 
the interviewing method and questioning are presented to each subject in a 47 
consistent manner.  This is an attempt to minimize extraneous variables in data 
collection by presenting an environment where the questions and all partieipant­
experimenter interactions are predetermined.  Using this technique provides a very 
systematic approach, with little opportunity for experimenter bias.  However, on 
the other hand, there is  little opportunity for the subject to elaborate on internal 
thoughts and justifications of observed behavior. 
Fischer and Geiselman (1992) developed the cognitive interviewing 
technique.  Its initial application was in crime investigation, where investigators 
were tasked with interviewing eyewitnesses to crimes.  They found that traditional 
interviewing methods had several shortcomings that often hampered criminal 
investigations.  Through extensive development and testing, Fischer and Geiselman 
established that the cognitive interview is superior to traditional eyewitness 
interviewing techniques ill  gathering specific details about a crime.  They identify 
13  basic concepts that aid in  the retrieval of detailed information that is stored in 
memory, but is not readily accessible.  Not all of these concepts are appropriate for 
this application of the technique, but some were anticipated to be very useful in 
extracting the information about how the pilot prioritizes tasks in an operational 
environment.  The 13 concepts of the cognitive interview are: 
I.  Encouraging active information generation on the part of the subject. 
2.  Active listening on the part of the interviewer. 
3.  Asking open-ended questions. 
4.  Pausing after the subject's response before asking follow-up questioning. 
S.  Not interrupting the subject during information retrieval. 
6.  Explicitly requesting detailed descriptions of information. 
7.  Encouraging the subject to concentrate intensely. 
8.  Encouraging the subject to use imagery. 
9.  Recreating the original event context. 
10. Adopting the subject's perspective 
II. Asking subject-compatible questions. 
12.  Following thc sequence of the cognitive interview. 48 
13.  Establishing rapport with the subject. 
At  the core of the cognitive interview are several key concepts.  First, the 
interviewer should strive to recreate the original context of the situation of interest. 
Second, the subject should be encouraged to form mental images of the situation, 
and the interviewer can facilitate that effort by carefully worded questions and 
ample time for the subject to form the images.  Finally, the interviewer should help 
guide the subject through a systematic evaluation of those mental images.  Through 
these concepts, at least in eyewitness interviews, a surpassingly rich and complete 
recall of information can be achieved. 
In order to use the cognitive interview in this experiment, the experimenter 
extensively studied the cognitive interviewing technique and practiced applying it 
to subjects before data collection began. 
Probe Selection Points 
One of the critical aspects of this study was the selection of the probing 
conditions.  One of the hypotheses of prioritization strategies is that the 
prioritization of tasks is directly related to the task environment.  The challenge for 
the present research is to select points that are not identical conditions, but 
representative of the task environment. 
One approach was to randomly select data collection points.  This was not 
chosen for the following reason.  The task environment is very dynamic, and pilots 
move from being almost idle to quite busy, and vice versa, very quickly.  With 
relativel y few data collection points for each pilot, the high probability of probing a 
pilot during a nearly idle condition is quite high.  This study was investigating the 
tactical or reactionary characteristics of behavior and was not focused on strategic 
or planning-ahead behaviors, when current task demands were few (see Chapter 2). 
Therefore, a systematic probing strategy was desired that queried pilots when they 
had multiple tasks active, yet not identical task conditions. 49 
This study identified three types of events.  These events are generally 

representative of the tactical flying environment of an arrival/approach phase of 

flight: 

J. 	 Procedure Events - these are events that occur as part of the mission tasks. 
For instance, as the pilot intercepts the instrument landing system (ILS) 
localizer (see Glossary in  Appendix 1), the indication needle begins to move. 
This is a cue for the pilot to begin the turn onto the final approach.  It is a 
standard procedure for pilot to follow: when the instrument commands turning 
the aircraft on to final approach, the pilot performs the task.  These are 
anticipated events, and the pilot waits for the cue to begin the task, then follows 
the procedure to complete the task. 
2. 	 ATC Events - these are the incoming Air Traffic Control (A  TC) calls that the 
pilots must interpret, adjust goal structures and then form and deliver a 
response.  These are often expected events, but the exact time of occurrence and 
detailed content is  not known. 
3. 	 Malfunction Events - these are unexpected events.  They represent some 
equipment malfunction in the aircraft.  These are of a cautionary nature, and 
can be immediately threatening to the airworthiness of the aircraft.  The pilot 
knows the correct procedure to respond to and fix these malfunctions. 
At each of these events, a probe opportunity exists just before and just after 
the event.  Because of the nature of the intrusive interviewing technique, it is not 
practical to probe both before and after each of these events during a single 
scenario, as there was insufficient time to resume the simulator tlight scenario. 
Therefore, only one of the opportunities (before OR after) was probed during the 
each of the scenarios. (For a complete description of the experimental design, see 
below.) 
Prediction of  Factors that Affect Prioritization 
As mentioned above, the objective of this study was to identify the factors 
that pilot use to prioritize tasks.  A review of the task management literature found 50 
no other studies that have specifically addressed this issue, so this appears to be the 
first study of its kind.  While no data collection has been performed on this topic, 
the literature suggests factors that drive task prioritization (see Table 3.1). 
It was anticipated that if this list was presented to pilots and instructions 
given to classify which of these factors affect their prioritization scheme, the reply 
would be a blank stare.  Therefore, the approach used in this study was to let the 
pilots verbalize, in their own words, how and why they prioritized tasks in  the 
simulator environment.  The elicitation and interviewing techniques described 
above were used to merely provide an opportunity for the pilot to verbalize 
prioritization schemes.  These interviews were then analyzed after the interviews, 
and the pilots' responses were categorized into prioritization factors. 
Summary 
The present study was essentially performed with hypothesis generation as 
a primary objective.  Virtually no data had been collected in an operational 
environment on how pilots prioritize the multiple, concurrent tasks that are inherent 
on the flight deck.  It was anticipated that through this experiment, an initial 
indication of the factors that affect task prioritization would be gained. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants for this study were 8 airline pilots, all male, with an 
average of 7472.5 total flying hours.  They had an  average of 984.4 hours of single 
pilot time and 666.9 hours of electronic flight instrument system (EFIS) experience. 
Their age range was 25 to 44, with an average of 35.6 years.  They were recruited 
on a volunteer basis and were not compensated in  any way. 5 I 

Equipment 
The part-task simulator was the NASA Stone-Soup Simulator version 4. I 
obtained from NASA-Ames Research Center.  The hardware consisted of 2 SGr 
Indigo2 workstations, running the IRIX 6.2 operating system.  The workstations 
were networked together, with one serving as the experimenter's station and the 
other displaying the simulator interface for the pilot.  The simulator night control 
was performed with a B&G Flybox and a mouse connected to the pilot's 
workstation.  Video equipment included a Panasonic 8mm camcorder, Sony PVM­
1910 video monitor and Videonics MX-I video mixer to obtain the picture-in­
picture configuration.  Video from the pilot's workstation was collected using an 
SGI Galileo Video board and software for NSTC video output.  Audio equipment 
included a Panasonic WM-F2040 stereo cassette recorder to record pilot interviews. 
Experimental Design 
Data collection for the experiment consisted of two flight scenarios, 
designated as Bravo and Sierra (Figure 4.1  and Figure 4.2).  These were similar 
scenarios, yet different enough that pilots could not anticipate A  TC instructions for 
headings, altitudes and airspeeds or timing and type of equipment malfunction 
events.  Subjects were balanced so that half of the subjects ran the Bravo scenario 
first and half ran the Sierra scenario first. 52 
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Figure 4.1  The Bravo Scenario. 53 
Sierra Experimental Scenario with Data Collection Points 
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Figure 4.2  The Sierra Scenario. 
In each scenario, the elicitation method used was either the retrospective 
technique or the intrusive technique.  If the subject performed the intrusive 54 
technique first, then the retrospective technique was used on the second scenario. 
Subjects were balanced so that half performed the intrusive technique first, while 
half performed the retrospective technique first. 
In  each scenario, six events were identified: two procedure events, two ATe 
events and two malfunction events (see Figures 4-1  and 4-2).  Pilots were then 
probed just before or just after each event.  The design was such that if a pilot was 
probed just before the first event on the first scenario, then he was probed after the 
first event on the second scenario, and vice versa, thus getting full coverage of the 
event over two scenarios.  This was the case for all six events in each scenario, thus 
totaling twelve probes over both scenarios. 
The experimental design was a full 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design with a full, 
single replication using 8 subjects.  The treatments were: Scenario Order 
(Bravo/Sierra), Elicitation Technique (Retrospective/Intrusive) and Probe Timing 
(Before Event/After Event).  This was given to the 8 subjects according to Table 
4.1. 55 
Subject #  I sl  Scenario  Retrollnlrusive  Event  I  Event 2  Event 3  Event 4  Event 5  Event 6 
I  Bravo  Retro  Bef()re  After  Before  After  Before  After 
2 Sierra  Retro  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 
3 Bravo  Intrusi ve  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 
4 Sierra  Intrusive  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 
5 Bravo  Retro  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before 
6 Sierra  Retro  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before 
7 Bravo  Intrusive  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before 
8 Sierra  Intrusive  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before 
Subject #  2nd Scenario  Retro/Intrusive  Event I  Event 2  Event 3  Event 4  Event 5  Event 6 
I  Sierra  Intrusive  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before 
2 Bravo  Intrusive  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before 
3 Sierra  Retro  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before 
4 Bravo  Retro  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before 
5 Sierra  Intrusive  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 
6 Bravo  Intrusive  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 
7 Sierra  Retro  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 
8 Bravo  Retro  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 
Table 4.1  Experimental Design. 
Simulator tasks 
The tasks performed in the part-task simulator were designed to be 
consistent with actual flying tasks as much as possible.  At the highest level, the 
mission goal was to fly the simulator the final  100 miles of an arrival into the San 
Francisco International airport (SFO).  Pilots were given the published Big Sur-2 
Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR) plate and a procedure plate for the San 
Francisco runway 28-right instrument landing system (SFO 28R lLS). 
While the simulator's displays and behavior was similar to a real aircraft, 
there were significant differences that required explanation to the pilots.  For 
example, tasks such as dialing radio frequencies and altitude dial settings were 
accomplished using software buttons manipulated by the mouse instead of the 
physical knobs as in actual aircraft.  The purpose of the explanation was to 56 
familiarize the pilots with the display layout and manipulation of the simulator's 
various controls (See Figure 4.3). 
Figure 4.3  Stone Soup Simulator Screen Shot 
Primary aircraft control was accomplished by manipulating the joystick for 
pitch and roll. There were no yaw control devices, such as rudder pedals.  No use of 
automated fligbt control, such as autopilots, were allowed for this study.  However, 
use of the flight director was required, and was very beneficial in aiding primary 
aircraft control.  The flight director consists of command bars located on the 
attitude indicator, which direct pilot joystick inputs to accomplish desired heading 57 
and pitch for the aircraft.  This functionality was used in an attempt to moderate 
pilot effort in  primary control, since joystick input to the simulator was very 
sensitive. 
Navigational equipment was limited to a single very-high-frequency 
omnirange (VOR) navigational instrument (see Glossary in  Appendix I for aviation 
equipment definitions).  While this is a very minimal configuration, it was ample 
for the scenarios and is an accurate partial representation of true navigational tasks. 
VOR displays and controls consisted of the navigational display, which included a 
VOR deviation indicator, DME distance from the ground-based VOR, course 
setting and VOR frequency.  The VOR frequency control was located on the 
navigational radio display, and the course input selector (CRS) was located on the 
mode control panel. 
Communications between the pilot and simulated A  TC was performed by 
direct verbal exchangc, as the pilot and experimenter were within approximately 5 
feet of each other.  Verbal exchanges were restricted to standard radio procedures 
and there was no free conversation between pilot and experimenter during data 
collection scenarios.  As a small added communications task, the pilot was required 
to dial in  the proper communications radio frequency before an exchange with 
ATe. 
Other system management tasks were performed in the simulator through 
various controls and displays.  For example, equipment malfunctions illuminated 
the caution indicator and display a message in the Engine Indication and Crew 
Altering System (EICAS) display area.  The equipment malfunctions could then be 
acknowledged and reset by performing a series of mouse click inputs to the 
multifunction display/control panel of the simulator. 
Pilots were never given clearance to fly the entire STAR, but used the 
information provided on the STAR to provide reference information regarding 
navigational waypoints and distances. A  TC, which was simulated by the 
experimenter, provided clearances for the pilots to follow which led them inbound 
for interception of the ILS navigational aids for final approach. 58 
A task analysis for this study was simplified and refined from the analyses 
performed by Alter and Regal (1992) and McGuire, et aI.  (1990).  This resulted in 
the 21  tasks listed in Table 4.2.  This is consistent with the standard ANCS 
taxonomy discussed in Chapter 2. 
Aviate Tasks  Navigate Tasks  Communicate  Manage Systems  General Tasks 
Tasks 

Monitor/Control 
 Review  Interpret ATC  Monitor/Manage  Plan ahead 
AD!  Arrival!  Approach  instructions and  aircraft subsystems 
Plates  clearances 
Monitor/Control  Set navigational  Record ATC  Other MCP input 
Heading  frequency  instructions and 

(YORfILS) as 
 clearances 
r~uired 
Monitor/Control  Maintain  Acknowledge  Correct system 
Altitude (Pitch)  awareness of  receipt of ATC  faults 
altitude restrictions  instructions and 
clearances 
General Scan of  Monitor DME  Transmit requests  Perform checklists 
Instruments (no  distance  toATC 
specific 
instrument) 
Monitor/Control  Monitor HSI  Change Comm 
Speed  Display  frequency 
Set VOR CRS dial 
Table 4.2  Simulator Task Analysis. 
Procedure 
Pilots arrived for the 2.5-hour experiment and immediately completed an 
informed consent document (Appendix 2) and pre-trial questionnaire (Appendix 3) 
to record flight experience, age and to ensure no extenuating circumstances 
interfered with the trial, such as excessive caffeine or lack of sleep the night before. 59 
Pilots were then given a brief overview of the experiment.  They were 
notified that their flying performance was not being measured in  this experiment 
and that their comments made to the experimenter would be separated from their 
names and would be kept confidential.  The sequence of the experiment consisted 
of approximately 45 minutes of training on the simulator followed by 2 data­
collection scenarios flown on the simulator.  Each pilot flew a scenario using the 
intrusive elicitation technique and a scenario using the retrospective technique.  The 
order of the application of techniques was determined by the experimental design 
outlined above. 
The training consisted of 2 or more flights.  The initial flight took a very 
informal form, with the experimenter introducing each of the displays and controls 
while directing the pilot to fly certain headings and altitudes.  During this time, the 
pilot was free to ask questions about the simulator, as he became familiar with the 
location and format of information related to piloting the simulated aircraft.  After 
approximately 15 minutes for the initial flight, the simulator was reset, and another 
flight was initiated.  During the second flight, navigation information was given to 
the pilot in the form of ATe instructions.  However, the pilot was still free to ask 
questions and, if required, the simulator was paused to explain more about 
operation of the simulator.  During these flights, aircraft configuration checklists 
and equipment malfunction procedures were covered and practiced several times. 
After completion of the second training flight, the pilot was asked if he felt he 
required more training to become comfortable with the simulator.  On occasion, a 
pilot requested an additional run through a particular portion of the training flight, 
and he was accommodated.  Each of these training flights was loosely associated 
with the Big Sur-2 arrival so the pilot could become familiar with the navigational 
waypoints and DME distances, but the Bravo or Sierra data collection scenarios 
were never duplicated. 
After training, pilots were given the opportunity for a short break.  Next, a 
general description of the data collection scenario was presented, explaining how 
each of the interviewing technique was applied (retrospective using a videotape 60 
playback, and intrusive, immediately interrupting the scenario).  The following 
instructions were given to the pilot: 
At  certain  till/es,  I  will  stop  the  simulator  (or  pause  the  I'ideotape, 
depending on  \(,ilich scenario lVe  are performing) and I \('ill ask rOll several 
qllestions.  SOllie of these qllestions will be straigh(forlvard, and others will 
reqllire you to  carefully think about your response.  There  is  no rif{/zt  or 
wrong  answer;  I  just  want  you  elaborate  on  your  answers  as  lIIuch  as 
possihle.  If something pops into your mind,  dOIl't  hesitate to jllsT  /JIlirt  it 
Ollt,  it lila), be all important detail, 
Occasionally,  I  will ask a (Iuestion,  and I  will wallt YOIl  to  care/idly think 
ahout the response hefore you re,\pond.  The purpose of this pause is to let 
YOll  form  a  mental  image  of the  circumstances  before  YOli  begin  your 
respollse.  Please don't hold any thoughts back,  I am interested ill  all the 
information YOll call generate. 
I  will ojien refer to  "tasks."  What I mean by task is just the jobs that the 
pilot performs  while flying.  For  example,  we  consider  looking  at  and 
thinking aboltt the DME distance on the HSI as the "DME task."  However, 
just looking at the  P FD is  too general for this study,  so  we  will he more 
specific.  For example.  what part of the  PFD are  you  looking  at?  The 
attitude indicator,  the ainpeed or the vertical speed?  We  H'oilid ca/l each 
ofthese alZ  individual task. 
Are there any qllestions? 
The initial data collection scenario then began.  Once again, the order of the 
SierralBravo scenarios and Intrusive/Retrospective methods were predetermined 
according to the experimental design described above, 
For the retrospective technique, the entire flight scenario was flown 
uninterrupted and videotaped.  During the scenario, the experimenter recorded the 
precise simulator time that each of the events occurred so that the videotape could 
be paused upon review with the pilot.  Upon completion of the scenario, the pilot 
was repositioned to view the video monitor and a replay of the just-completed 
scenario was started.  As the videotape playback approached each of the event 
times, the pilot was alerted that a probe would be initiated very shortly.  The 30 
seconds of videotape preceding the event was reviewed three times and after the 
third time, the videotape was paused and a probe was performed. 61 
The probe began in a structured manner, asking specific questions about 
what tasks the pilot was performing when the videotape was paused.  The first part 
01 the probe was to establish the task currently attended, the task that was to be 
attended to next, and a list of remaining tasks that werc currently active in the 
pilot's mcmory.  Following this identification of thc pilot's current task list, a series 
or qucstions were posed that probed why the current task had a higher priority than 
the other tasks listed.  It was during this portion of the probe that the techniques of 
the cognitive interview were employed in an attempt to retrieve as much insightful 
and detailed information from the pilot as possible as to what factors influenced the 
prioritization of tasks. 
The initial dialog of the probe was presented to the pilots as follows: 
What task are you attending to right now? 
What task will you attend to next? 
What other tasks are you currently performing?  1don't mean actually 
attending to the task right now, but other tasks to \\'hich \'OU know you must 
lIlonitor and respond. 
Let's now return to the current task.  You  said \'o{{  were attending to the 
(currellt task). 1don't want you to respond right (may, hlltfirst carefully 
consider your response.  Think about all the things that were going through 
vOllr mind while you were working on the (currellt task). 
Why was it that your were attending to the (current task) instead ofthe 
(Ilext task)?  Take just a few seconds to think a/Jout this,  then talk as much 
as V()II call about why you were attending to  this task.  1 \\'ant as much detail 
a/Jollt why as you can generate. 
(PAUSE, as the experimenter is writing notes ofthe respollse) 
(At this point, the experimenter is trying to listen to the response and 
determine the factors that are being mentioned. 
(The experimenter will now have one or more factors recorded on the data 
collectio/1 sheet.) 
YOll  melltioned (factor 1) as one (~lthe reasons you were attellding to the 
(current task).  Tell me more aho[{t (factor I) (Pause).  Is this something 62 
1I.\'lIolfor rOll, or is this a  special situation'! (Pause) Why? (Pause)  Is there 
anything else YO// ('(In  tell 111(' abollt (factor 1) '! 
(RclJcat this/or each task olldfactor) 
As was discussed earlier, the cognitive interview allows for deeper probing 
on certain items reported hy the subject.  This concept was employed as often as 
possible in  an attempt to get as much information from the pilot as possible 
regarding prioritization strategies. 
For the scenarios that were performed using the intrusive technique, the 
probing technique was identical.  The difference in the intrusive technique is that 
upon reaching the events in the scenario, the simulator was stopped and the probe 
initiated immediately, within several seconds of the pilot actually flying the 
simulator.  All probes were recorded using a cassette recorder for further analysis 
and review at a later time. 
After the pilot had completed the second scenario, he was immediately 
given a post-test questionnaire (Appendix 4), inquiring about how comfortable the 
pilot was with flying the scenario and if the training was adequate for testing 
purposes.  Additionally, the pilot was encouraged to discuss his thoughts and 
feelings about anything related to the experiment.  This completed the experiment. 
Results 
Data Analysis 
The cognitive interviews of the pilots resulted in approximately 7 hours of 
audio tape.  Although initial identification of tasks and prioritization factors was 
performed during the interviews, the experimenter performed a more thorough 
analysis by reviewing each probe response several times.  This post analysis 
resulted in minor adjustments to the task classification, but significant changes to 
the classification of prioritization factors. 
The process of analyzing the audio tapes for task prioritization factors was 
non-trivial.  The probes were reviewed with the objective of determining all of the 63 
prioritization factors that pilots reported.  After several iterations, the number of 
factors was set at  12, as this was the minimum numher of factors that captured all 
factors reported by the pilots. 
Next, each probe was reviewed in  an attempt to determine how long the 
prohe lasted, how detailed the pilot was during the prohe and how specific the pilot 
was regarding prioritization factors.  In subsequent replays, the pilots' responses 
were then categorized into one of the twelve factors.  It should be noted that every 
attempt was made to classify the pilots' responses according to what was said 
during the probe, and not what was inferred by the experimenter.  In other words, 
the analysis classified what the pilot actually verbalized and no attempt was made 
to infer beyond what the pilots said. 
Reported Frequency 
The analysis described above resulted in the identification of 12 factors that 
affect prioritization (See Table 4.3).  The factors in the table include generalized 
descriptions of the factors, including common quotes from pilot responses.  Recall 
that the task management literature suggested 13  possible factors.  However, this 
study, in essence, began with a clean slate.  The factors identified were solely a 
result of the analysis and not an attempt to fit the pilot's responses into a pre­
determined factor classification. 
Table 4.4 presents the factors that affect task prioritization in the order of 
most reported to least reported.  Two factors that clearly emerged were status with 
a total of 51  instances (30%) reported and procedure with 48 instances (28%) 
reported.  In the middle range of frequently reported factors was verifying 
information, reported 13 times (8%) and importance, reported 12 times (7%).  The 
remaining factors were reported less frequently (see Figure 4.4). 64 
Factor 
Procedure - The appropriate (according to the pilot) task to execute in this situation.  An 
cn\ironlllcntal cuc prompted this task. In  this situation, the task is always pcrformed.  "\Vhcn I arri vcd 
at  tile  waypoint, 1 initiated a turn because it  was the appropriate thing to do." 
Status· Current task status affected the prioritization of the task.  "My altitude was 100' feet low and 1 
was still dcscending.  I had to get my altitude back before I could do anything else." 
Rate of change - The rate of change or tlend of the task statu, affected the prioriti/.ation of the task.  "I 
was currcntly turning to a heading of 360, and 1 knew that if 1 looked away, I would overshoot my 
desired heading." 
Needed information - The task was the source of needed information. "I was attending to the 
na\'igational display because it had the information (DME distance) 1 needed at the time." 
Urgency - There was a time pressure to pcrform the task.  "I would be intercepting the localizer very 
soon, so 1 needed to configure the instruments for the ILS." 
Importance - The task was more important than the other tasks.  "On final approach, tracking the ILS 
is  the most important task." 
Verifying information - The task was being performed to crosscheck and verify other task status 
information.  'After leveling the wings (using the ADI), I checked the navigational display to verify 1 
was on the correct heading." 
TimelEffort required- The time/effort to perform task was small (or large) which affected 
prioritization of the task.  "I replied to ATe first, because it was quick and easy." 
Salience of display - The salience of the display prompted that the task be performed.  "The caution 
lights caught my attention, so 1 fixed the problems before returning to the checklist." 
Consequences· The consequences of not performing the task were great. The task has safety 
implications if it were not performed.  "If 1 didn't illltiate a turn, 1 would be in  violation of ATC 
instructions and it could be a safety consideration with other aircraft or terrain." 
Resist forgetting - The task was performed immediately to resist the tendency to forget the goal. 
"When ATC gives me an  altitude, I immediately input the altitude into the panel so I don't forget the 
number. " 
Expectancy - The task was performed with an expectancy of upcoming events.  "I was looking for 
things to do now. so 1 would have less to do when it got busy." 
Table 4.3  Factors that Affect Task Prioritization Reported by Pilots. 65 
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Table 4.4  Factors that Affect Task Prioritization - Frequency and Proportion. 
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Figure 4.4  Reported Frequency of Factor That Affect Task Prioritization. 66 
5,'igllijicallce Testillg 
Prioritization Factors 
Due to the nature of the cognitive interviewing technique, traditional 
analysis of variance on the reported prioritization factors was not appropriate 
(Montgomery, 1997; Ostle, 1963).  Therefore, an analysis was performed to 
determine if the frequency with which each factor was reported showed statistically 
significant differences from the other factors.  A chi-square test for counted data 
was applied to the results presented above.  In  this analysis, the null hypothesis 
states that all factors are equally likely.  A rejection of the null hypothesis accepts 
that the observed frequencies are not equally likely in each of the 12 factor 
categories (Devore, 1987). 
The chi-square statistic from this analysis had a value of 223.02 with 11 
degrees of freedom, resulting in rejection of the null hypothesis (p < .001).  In other 
words, there is  very strong evidence that the observed values do not come from a 
distribution where frequencies in each factor category are equally likely. 
Since the status and procedure factors had such high frequencies compared 
to the other prioritization factors, these two factors were removed and a the chi­
square test was performed on the remaining 10 factors.  This test had a chi-square 
value of 18.00 with 9 degrees of freedom, resulting in rejection of the null 
hypothesis (p < .05).  Thus, even with the high frequency factors removed, there is 
strong evidence that the remaining factors are not equally likely. 
Elicitation Technique 
The prioritization factors broken down by the elicitation technique is 
presentee! in Table 4.5.  A primary question of this study was to determine if the 
intrusive and retrospective techniques give significantly different results in data 
collection.  In order to determine if there was a significant difference in the 
frequency of factors reported between the two techniques, a chi-square test was 
applied to the 2 x 9 matrix in Table 4.5. 67 
In  this application of the chi-square test, the null hypothesis is  the 
assumption that the two rows come from the same distribution.  If we fail  to reject 
the null hypothesis, then the conclusion is made that thc two rows me not 
significantly different. 
The chi-square statistic from this analysis had a valuc of 4.36 (df = 11, P = 
0.9583).  Thus we fail to reject the null hypothesis and we conclude that the 
intrusive and retrospective elicitation techniques do not result in different results. 
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Table 4.5  Prioritization factors by Elicitation Technique. 
Event Effect 
Another concern with the nature of this experiment is the use of the three 
event types (scenario, ATe and malfunction).  Perhaps the prioritization factors 
depended upon which event was probed.  Table 4.6 presents the summary of 
prioritization factors reported by event type. 68 
z 
::l 
3 
[/) 
'J  .... 
::l 
-::J 
'J 
'.J 
0  .... 
Cl. 
';j 
E 
0
'=  -
01; 
,i::' 
.... 
V 
> 
v 
U  ::: 
t 
C 
0­
E 
or. 
'J 
:.J 
c: 
V 
::l 
c:T 
1.1 
cr. 
0 
U 
OJ 
~[J 
c: 
U 
";: 
~ 
C2 
J 
'J  .... 
c:T 
'J 
e:::: 
~ 
:..+:: 
,,'  -­ ~ 
f=: 
~, 
c. 
z 
~ 
~ 
V 
2 
'.J 
.0 
[/) 
;>, 
~ 
13 
'OJ)  .... 
::J 
c: 
.g 
'"  § 
-£ 
.5 
-::J 
V 
-::J 
V  v 
Z 
b1l 
c: 
0) 
b1l  .... 
0 
lL. 
~ 
Vi 
V 
c:z:: 
;>, 
u 
c: 
'"  tI 
1.1 
0­
><  w 
Event 1 (Scenario)  12  10  1  1  1  1  1  ()  0  I  0  0 
Event 2 (ATe)  9  6  2  0  1  2  2  ()  1  2  3  0 
Event:; (Malfunction)  6  9  2  0  1  4  I  2  0  2  0  0 
Event 4 (ATe)  8  9  1  I  0  3  2  I  0  2  0  0 
Event 5 (Scenario)  14  16  2  0  0  2  5  0  0  2  0  2 
Event 6 (Malfunction)  II  13  2  4  I  2  5  2  4  2  0  I 
All Scenario  26  26  :;  I  1  3  6  0  0  3  0  2 
All ATe  17  15  :;  I  I  5  4  1  I  4  3  0 
All Malfunction  17  22  4  4  2  6  6  4  4  4  ()  1 
Table 4.6  Prioritization factors by Event Type. 
The chi-square statistic from the individual breakdown of the 6 events was 
62,35 (df =55, P =,2312).  Thus, we fail  to reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that there is no statistical difference in the reporting of prioritization factors 
between the 6 events, 
Additionally, the chi-square statistic from the three event types was 26,13 
(df =22, P = ,2461),  Again, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that 
the prioritization factors are independent of the event type. 
Scenario Effect 
To determine if the two different scenarios had an effect on prioritization 
factors reported by the pilots, the frequencies were summed over the Bravo and 
Sierra scenarios (see Table 4.7). 69 
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Table 4.7  Prioritization factors by Scenario. 
The chi-square statistic from this analysis had a value of 6.70 (df =  11, P = 
0.8228).  We fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is  no 
statistical difference between the bravo and sierra scenarios. 
Timing Effect 
Half of the probes were performed before a critical event and half after the 
event.  To determine if the timing of the probe had an effect on the reporting of 
prioritization factors, the data was organized into Table 4.8, showing the timing of 
the probes before and after an event. 
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Table 4.8  Prioritization factors by Timing (Before/After). 
The chi-square statistic from this analysis had a value of 13.10 (df= 11, p = 
0.2868).  Again, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is no 
statistical difference between the before and after event timing of the probe. 70 
Discussion 
This study was an initial attempt to identify tbe factors that affect task 
prioritization.  The task environment required pilots to ny realistic, published 
arrivals in  a part-task simulator.  The method of prioritization factor elicitation was 
the cognitive interview using either the retrospective or intrusive technique. 
Status and procedure emerged as the two factors most reported by pilots. 
Additionally, verifying information, task importance and consequences of not 
performing task showed a substantial frequency of reporting.  Statistical tests 
confirmed that significant differences in the frequency of factor reporting were 
present and that there were no significant differences in the frequency of reporting 
for the elicitation technique (intrusive/retrospective), scenario flown (Bravo/Sierra) 
or the timing of the probe questioning (before/after). 
The Prioritization Factors 
Data analysis for this study presented a very challenging task for the author. 
The nature of the data collected was rich with insights into how pilots prioritize 
tasks, perform multiple concurrent tasks and, in general, make decisions on the 
night deck.  However. with such rich and complex data, interpretation and 
classification of pilot responses is, to say the least, very difficult. 
In  the next several paragraphs, a more detailed description of the 
prioritization factors is presented.  While none of these descriptions are direct 
quotes from the pilots, they represent the pilot's justifications of how task 
prioritization was accomplished.  They are presented in rank order of number of 
times reported. 
Status - The perceived status of the current task was unsatisfactory, so it 
was currently being performed to bring its status to a satisfactory level.  For 
instance, the pilot may have an assigned altitude of 15,000 feet.  If  the pilot were to 
find himself at an altitude of 100 feet or more below the clearance, it would result 
in the pilot consciously focusing on the task to reduce the deviation and get back to 
the assigned altitude.  Similarly, if the status of high priority tasks, such as the 71 
aviate tasks, were satisfactory, then attention could be allocated to other, non­
critical tasks. 
Procedure - The reason the current task was being performed was because 
it  was the proper task to execute in  the current context.  For instance, if an ATC 
instruction was given to descend to a particular altitude then the task was 
performed immediately.  The relationship between A TC and pilots is one that A  TC 
issues clearances and pilots follow those clearances.  Similarly, when the filed 
flight plan required a turn at a navigational waypoint, then when that waypoint was 
reached, the turn was initiated.  It was the procedure that needed to be followed in 
order to perform the duties of a pilot. 
Verifying Information - Often, a pilot will perform a task, then 
immediately perform an additional task with the purpose of verifying that the initial 
task was accomplished.  For instance, during the arrival, a pilot may initiate and 
complete a turn at a particular navigational waypoint.  Upon completion of the turn, 
he will switch his attention from the Primary Fight Display (PFD), to the 
Navigational Display (ND) to verify that the information regarding his heading 
obtained from the PFD is verified by the information on the ND.  It could be argued 
that this sequence of events is in fact all part of the same task (monitoring and 
controlling heading).  However, the approach taken in this study assumed that a 
change from one display to another constituted a task switch.  Ultimately, this level 
of specificity in  the task analysis would address this concern.  In the task analysis 
adopted for this study, the above example would represent a move from a primary 
aviate task to a task classified under the navigate category. 
Importance - The importance of a task, relative to other competing tasks, 
determines where a pilot will focus his attention.  There were many instances were 
the pilot reported that he was "flying the airplane first."  In other words, he was 
attending to the primary aviate tasks of monitoring and controlling heading, altitude 
and speed which took precedence over other tasks, such as performing checklists, 
planning ahead or determining current position on the arrival.  Pilots are very 
familiar with the ANCS ordering of tasks and strive to adhere to its hierarchy.  It 72 
should be noted that a pilot's response would not be categorized in this factor 
unless the pilot explicitly stated, '"this task was more important than the others." 
Consequences - Pilots reported the consequences of not performing the 
task and safety considerations associated with performing tasks.  For instance, the 
consequences or not maintaining the assigned altitude could result in conflict with 
other aircraft or terrain. 
Rate of change - When the status of a task is currently changing at a 
significant rate, the pilot tends to stay with that task until it is once again stabilized. 
For example, in a turn, where the heading of the aircraft is changing, pilots will 
closely monitor the progress of the task until they finish the turn and level the 
wings.  They realize that if they were to divert their attention to another task, that 
upon returning to the task, it may have progressed to a status that is very 
unsatisfactory (a turn past their desired heading). 
TimelEffort Required - Pilots reported that they evaluated the time and/or 
effort required to perform tasks and made decisions regarding which task to 
perform upon these evaluations.  It is interesting to note that some pilots selected 
the quick/easy task to perform first, while others selected the task that would take 
considerable time/effort to perform first. 
Salience of Stimulus - When there is a sudden, obvious change in a visual 
display, the pilots often switched their attention to the change, and at least, 
acknowledged its presence.  For instance, this might occur when an equipment 
malfunction event was activated and the yellow caution light was illuminated along 
with a message on the EICAS display.  It was interesting to note that the switch of 
attention was often very quick, to acknowledge the change, but then their attention 
was directed right back again to the task that was in progress when the visual 
change occurred.  In the interviews, they often talked about their conscious 
evaluation of the meaning of the change, their realization that the priority of the 
associated task was not greater than the currently active task, so they returned to the 
original task. 73 
Urgency - The urgency of a task is defined as the time it will take to 
complete a task in  relation to the time until the task needs to he completed.  Pilots 
are very aware of high workload situations, and continually try to "stay ahead of 
the airplane" hy performing tasks as early as possible.  However, in certain 
situations, tasks cannot be performed early and thus, take on urgency.  Pilots 
reported currently performing a task because it needed to be completed in  the very 
near future. 
Needed information - Pilots reported the reason they were attending to a 
particular task was that its displays contained needed information.  For example, 
when pilots were probed as to why they were monitoring the attitude indicator, 
their reply would be that it was the source information they needed in order to 
maintain heading and altitude. 
Resist Forgetting - This factor was directly related to compliance with 
ATC clearances.  Upon receiving an instruction from A TC, the pilots immediately 
began to give control inputs to the aircraft (usually the mode control panel), even 
before acknowledging the clearance with A  TC.  When prompted as to why they 
began immediate inputs, their reply was that they tended to forget clearances unless 
they immediately input the clearances into the mode control panel. 
Expectancy - Pilots often tried to perform tasks well in advance of when 
they needed to be performed.  Their justification for attending to such a task was 
that they were expecting a high workload in the near future, so they were 
attempting to get as much as possible done early so that they had more time to deal 
with the tasks during the high workload period.  This is  very consistent with 
strategic task management (Schutte and Trujillo, 1996), strategic workload 
management (Hart, 1989; Adams, et aI,  1991; Raby and Wickens, 1994) and occurs 
in times of low workload, which was not frequency encountered in this experiment. 
Comparison to predictions 
Recall from the introduction that although no studies have produced data on 
the prioritization of night tasks, the literature suggests 13 possible factors that 74 
affect task prioriti/,ation.  The current section evaluates the commonality between 
those predictions and what was empirically collected in this study. 
Table 4.9 compares the predicted factors with the factors reported by the 
pilots in this study.  It is  reassuring to find that the most reported factor, status, was 
in  fact predicted in the literature along with several other factors, such as 
importance, time/effort required and a few other less frequently reported factors. 
Factors Predicted In The Literature  Corresponding Factors Identified in this Study 
Advance knowledge of upcoming tasks  Expectancy 
Discriminability of task-related stimuli  (none) 
Differences in  level of effort required to 
process task-related stimuli 
Time/Effort Required 
Temporal proximity of task-related 
stimuli 
(none) 
Task importance: aviate> navigate> 
communication> manage systems 
Importance 
Perceived urgency of task (time 
remaining vs. time to complete) 
Urgency 
T  ask difficulty  Time/Effort Required 
(automation) task proficiency  Time/Effort Required 
task recency  (none) 
task momentum: tendency to continue 
to perform the current task 
(none) 
task proximity to completion  (none) 
amount of effort already invested in 
tasks 
(none) 
perceived task status (satisfactory, 
unsatisfactory) 
Status 
Table 4.9  Comparison of Predicted Factors to Reported Factors. 75 
However, a factor not predicted, procedure, was very apparent in the pilot's 
reporting of prioritization factors.  This is puzzling because fOf pilots, this was a 
very intuitive and obvious justification as to what task was currently being 
performed.  During a probe, when the pilot was performing a task that was required 
to  tly the scenario, such as turning the aircraft to the proper heading at a 
navigational waypoint, the pilot's justification for performing that task was to the 
effect, "The current situation requires that I perform this task right now."  When 
probed deeper, often the pilots could not verbalize any other reason for attending to 
the task other than the procedure of flying demanded that the task be performed at 
that point in time. 
Another factor, importance, predicted in the literature, was explicitly 
reported only 7% in this study.  However, the ANCS task hierarchy is well known 
by pilots, and practiced rigorously.  In fact, during the probes, the primary aviate 
tasks were reported as the current task more than 80% of the time.  It was 
surprising that the importance factor did not appear more frequently in the probes. 
Perhaps this factor is such a significant part of a pilot's routine behaviors and 
decision making that it has taken on tacit knowledge characteristics, and it not 
consciously processed by pilots.  Therefore, although it may affect how a pilot 
prioritizes tasks, he does not explicitly realize its influence and is therefore unable 
to report it verbally during a probe.  Again, it should be noted that during data 
analysis, pilots would have to report that one task was "more important" than 
another task for the importance factor to be identified. 
Reduction of  Prioritization Factors 
In the present section, the effort is directed at given meaning to the factors 
reported by the pilots.  Upon retlection on the prioritization factors presented 
earlier, it is readily apparent that there exist relationships between the factors. 
Recall, however, that the objective of the data analysis was to classify what the 
pilots reported and not an attempt to infer what the pilots really meant. 76 
Status 
The single most reported factor in  this study was status.  Pilots reported that 
the current unsatisfactory (or satisfactory) status of a task at least partially 
determined why the current task was the focus of attention.  Rate of change of task 
status was reported as a separate factor, but this is closely related to status.  It is 
known by the pilots that if they were to divert attention away from a task while its 
status is rapidly changing, it is possible that upon returning to the task, it will have 
an unsatisfactory status. 
Verifying information is a crosscheck to reassure that what one source of 
status information reports is consistent with another information source.  Therefore, 
verifying information is consistent with the status factor. 
On the tlight deck, many of the displays do not have excessively salient 
stimuli.  For instance, the altitude display on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) is 
continually changing and appears very much the same if the altitude reading is 
35,000 ft.  or 100 ft.  However, the status and warning indicators and EICAS 
message display areas are designed with the intent of capturing attention when 
information is  available that the pilot needs to be informed about, such as 
exceeding aircraft limitations or equipment malfunctions.  Ifthe aircraft were to 
descent below 500 ft.  without being configured for landing (gear down, flaps 
extended, etc.), the altitude display on the PFD merely displayed the altitude. 
However, the red warning light would flash and an EICAS message that alerts the 
pilot to an unsafe condition was displayed.  In essence, the warning light and 
EICAS message are delivering status information about the aircraft or subsystems, 
so the factor salience of stimulus is related to the status factor. 
Urgency also appears to be related to status.  When a task is very urgent, its 
status will need to be complete or satisfactory in a relatively short time.  As an 
extreme example, if vertical speed of the aircraft is -1500 fUmin. and the altitude 
of the aircraft is  1500 ft.  above ground level, the status of the altitude task is 
satisfactory for the moment.  However, after 30 seconds, the urgency of the altitude 
task is  beginning to increase.  If the pilot does not respond and give control inputs ---------- -------------- --- ---------- ----
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rather quickly, then the status of the altitude task will become severely 
unsatisfactory in a very short time. 
Finally, needed information, although reported very infrequently also 
appears to be status related.  When a pilot stated that that he was attending to a task 
because it was the source of needed information, he was after the information to 
determine a status parameter of the aircraft. 
So the factors rate of change, verifying information, salience of stimulus, 
urgency and needed information are all related to the general prioritization factor 
status and is visually depicted in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5  The General Status Prioritization Factor (52%). 
Procedure 
During the interviews, pilots reported that the reason they were performing 
the current task was because it was the correct procedure to execute at the current 
time and in  the current context.  This appears to be a very intuitive and obvious 78 
justification of current task focus, however, upon closer examination, this may be 
the most complex factor identified in  this study. 
There are at least two dimensions to the procedure factor.  First, there is an 
externally driven dimension, wher.: the pilot waits for external cues from the 
environment to initiate a task.  For example. if the pilot has an ATC instruction to 
turn the aircraft to a heading when it reaches a navigational waypoint, then when 
the aircraft reaches the waypoint, the pilot initiates the procedure and turns the 
aircraft.  He follows the procedure when the environmental cue is encountered. 
However. the representation of procedural knowledge in the mind is  very 
much an internal dimension of the procedure factor.  Exactly how humans 
represent, store and recall this type of knowledge is a research area with much 
activity, yet there is no consistent agreement on how this process functions 
(Anderson and Lebiere, 1999).  Additionally, interactions between procedural 
knowledge and memory systems (long term and short term) do not have exact, 
widely accepted theory (NRC. 1998).  To understand this internal dimension might 
equate to an overall theory of human cognitive processing. 
Another factor reported by pilots was the expectancy of upcoming events. 
The pilots were searching for opportunities to perform anticipated procedures at an 
earlier time in  the flight scenario.  This suggests a link to the procedure factor. 
The resist forgetting factor and the time/effort factor appear closely linked 
for the following reason.  In the simulator. when the pilot was issued a clearance by 
ATC (simulated by the experimenter). he was handed a slip of paper with the 
clearance.  The purpose of the slip was to allow the pilot to continue flying and not 
require him to write down clearances.  If the pilot were to forget the clearance, he 
merely needed to glance down at the slip to again read the clearance.  So the pilot's 
justification of performing the task to avoid forgetting it is really an attempt at 
reducing the time and effort of performing the task.  Similarly on the actual flight 
deck, the pilot has several resources available if he were to forget a clearance.  He 
could ask his copilot for the information (small time/effort investment) or he could 
contact ATe again to obtain the information (a substantial time/effort investment). 79 
Further, the time/effort factor is an evaluation of the procedure to be 
performed and an estimation of the requirements to perform the task.  Therefore. it 
is  suggested that the time/effort factor is related to the procedure factor. 
Therefore. a second general factor labeled status is suggested, with the sub­
factors expectancy, time/effort required and resists forgetting configured as in 
Figure 4.6. 
- -­ -­----c:::==-----------, 
Procedure 
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Time/Effort 
Required 
Expectancy 
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Figure 4.6  The General Procedure Prioritization Factor (35%). 
Value 
The two factors importance and consequences of not performing a task are 
closely related.  To a pilot, a task is important if failing to perform it jeopardizes 
the safety of the aircraft or passengers, violates FAA regulations or fails to comply 
with A  TC clearances.  When the pilots reported the consequences of not 
performing a task in the interviews, they were mostly concerned with safety and 
non-compliance implications. 80 
The general prioritization factor proposed that encompass importance and 
consequences is  labeled value, and presentee! in  Figure 4.7.  It can be 
conceptualized as the value or worth of performing the task towards reaching the 
goal or subgoals of the night. 
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Figure 4.7  The General Value Prioritization Factor (13%). 
For example, if the overall mission goal of a flight is to deliver the 
passengers to the intended destination safely, quickly and comfortably, then 
subgoals of the mission might he decomposed into such goals as comply with A TC 
clearances and avoid exceeding aircraft performance limitations.  Using the general 
prioritization factor then, pilots consider the value of performing a task as they 
determine their prioritization strategy while flying. 
Similar to the general procedure factor, the value factor has internal 
representations that are not obvious or sharply defined.  For example, when a pilot 
is challenged with the decision to comply with an ATC-instructed altitude change 
and a significant equipment malfunction simultaneously, which has a higher value? 
Failure to comply with ATC may result in an unsafe conflict with other aircraft or 
terrain, but failure to deal with a critical equipment malfunction may also escalate 
into a situation where the aircraft becomes no longer flyable.  It is in these 
situations that a pilot's knowledge, including training and experience, emerge to 81 
assign valuc to the tasks and prioritize in such a way as to meet the overall mission 
goals. 
A Model of  Task Prioritization 
The discussion presented above idcnti  fie~ three general categories of 
prioritization factors: status, procedure and value.  These three general categories 
incorporate all twelve of the specific factors identified in the interviews of the 
pilots. 
While three distinct general factors emerge, there appears to be a logical 
relationship between them.  The status factor represents the current state of the 
world.  The value factor represents the desired state of the world or simply the goal 
state.  The goal state is the pilot's understanding and internal representation of what 
state the system needs to be in for the mission goals to be met.  Finally, the general 
procedure factor is the link between the current state and the goal state.  In other 
words, the pilot, operating the system in the current state, uses procedures to obtain 
the goal state.  Figure 4.8 graphically presents this model of task prioritization. --
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Figure 4.8  The Model of Task Prioritization. 
In  this model, the task prioritization process is dri ven by three general 
factors status (52%), procedure (35%) and value (13%).  It should be noted that the 
weighting of the factors is preliminary and is based on the relatively limited data 
collected in  this experiment. 
The relationship between the value and procedure factors may be closely 
intertwined.  In  a normative theory, the development of the procedures is based on 
the value of performing the tasks.  In other words, the procedures are a sequence of 
tasks that are performed in the order of the highest value.  Therefore, the value of 
performing the task is inherent to the procedures that pilots perform on the flight 
deck.  To a certain extent, the pilots realize this, and they are confident that if they 
perform the procedures the important tasks will be attended to and the 83 
consequences of not performing tasks will be minimized.  Simply stated, the pilots 
trust the procedures. 
Umitatiolls 
A fundamental limitation of this study deals with the nature of task 
prioritization.  In  this study, we relied on the pilot's verbalization of the 
prioritization process to obtain a sense of how task prioritization is  accomplished. 
If, in  fact, prioritization is an accessible, explicit behavior, than it is likely that this 
study was able to record and analyze at least part of those factors that affect task 
prioritization.  However. if task prioritization is truly an implicit, unconscious 
process that pilots are not able to explicitly identify, then this study falls short of its 
expectations.  Until researchers make further gains in an overall better 
understanding of human cognition and are able to identify which mental processes 
are explicitly accessible, this fundamental question will go unanswered.  At this 
time, we continue with the assumption that task prioritization is, at least, partially 
an explicit process that pilots can identify and discuss. 
Another limitation is the possibility of experimenter bias.  The entire study 
was developed, performed and analyzed by the author.  Every attempt was made to 
approach all data collection and analysis from a neutral perspective and not to 
succumb to a confirmation bias associated with expectancies of task prioritization 
factors.  The author is confident in his neutral approach, however only additional 
research that generates supportive evidence of the findings in this experiment 
would truly eliminate this possible limitation. 
As with all laboratory experiments, this study had limitations of ecological 
validity.  It  is true that the simulator used in this study was a single pilot, part-task 
simulator that differs greatly from the real world tlight deck, which includes two 
pilots in an operatIOnal setting.  However, the objective of the simulator was to put 
the pilots in the frame of mind of flying a published arrival and to challenge them 
with real-world thought processes and decision making.  In the post-test 
questionnaire, each pilot expressed that the part-task simulator was sLlccessful in 84 
that respect, and they found themselves thinking like a pilot and performing the 
tasks present in  the operational environment. 
One opportunity for improvement associated with the simulator 
environment would be to present more challenging instances where task 
prioritization occurs.  In  this study, there were relatively few instances where the 
pilot was truly overloaded and had to prioritize more than 3 tasks.  In  other words, 
workload levels were always manageable and the consequences associated with the 
relatively minor equipment malfunctions were too insignificant.  For future 
experiments, it  is suggested that more non-aviate tasks be placed on the pilot in 
addition to more severe equipment malfunctions, where the consequences might be 
much more detrimental than in  the current experiment. 
Conclusions 
The primary objecti ve  of this study was to identify factors that affect 
prioritization. Analysis of the pilot interviews resulted in 12 factors that were 
subsequently reduced to the three general prioritization factors of status, procedure 
and value.  These factors formed the basis of a model of task prioritization (Figure 
4.8). 
With this model, we believe we have at least a preliminary understanding of 
task prioritization.  However, because this study was essentially a hypothesis 
generation exercise, we are now tasked with developing further studies to support 
and refine the findings presented here. 
The ultimate goal of the present research is twofold.  First, with a better 
understanding of the prioritization process, perhaps training techniques can be 
developed that explain this process to pilots and explicitly emphasize how experts 
perform task prioritization, with the objective of modifying inexperienced pilot 
behavior to be marc consistent with the behaviors observed in experienced pilots. 
Secondly, the realization that the general status factor had such a major 
influence on the prioritization process is supportive of use of pilot aids that assist 
the pilot in enhancing situation awareness of the current state of the aircraft.  Even 85 
if these aids arc not destined for usc in the operational flight deck, again, perhaps 
they can be employed in a training role to help pilots better prioritize tasks. 
A secondary, methodological objective of this study was to evaluate 
elicitation techniques.  In  this study, we used both the intrusive and retrospective 
techniques and could determine no difference in the data that was collected with the 
techniques.  Therefore, we conclude that in future studies, we can elect to utilize 
the technique that will hest facilitate the study. 86 
CHAPTER 5: 

FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF FACTORS THAT AFFECT TASK 

PRIORITIZA  TION ON THE FLIGHT DECK 

Introduction 
The objective of the second study was to further investigate the pilots' use 
of a subset of prioritization factors identified in Chapter 4 (Figure 4.8).  Pilots flew 
final approach procedures on a part-task simulator.  The retrospective interviewing 
technique, in coordination with a Challenge Probe Point (CPP) questionnaire was 
used to probe subjects for factors that influenced their task prioritization strategy. 
Additionally, task performance data was collected and analyzed with the objective 
of identifying a relationship between task performance and prioritization factors 
used by pilots. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants for this study were 8 airline pilots, all male, with an 
average of 6838 total flying hours.  They had an average of 2531 hours of single 
pilot time and 481  hours of "glass cockpit" experience.  Their age range was 25 to 
52, with an average of 34.6 years.  They were paid a stipend and travel expenses for 
their participation in the study. 
Equipment 
The part-task simulator was the NASA Stone-Soup Simulator version 4.1 
obtained from NASA-Ames Research Center.  The hardware consisted of 3 SGI 
Indig02 workstations, running the IRIX 6.2 operating system.  The workstations 
were networked together, two for pilot displays and the other for the experimenter 
control of the simulator.  The simulator flight control was performed with a B&G 87 
Systems Flybox and 2 mice connected to the pilot's workstations.  Video 
equipment included a Panasonic 8I11m camcorder, Sony PVM-J91O video monitor, 
Videonics MX-J  video mixer to obtain the picturc-in-picture configuration.  Video 
from the pilot's workstation was achIeved using an SGI Galileo Video board and 
software for NSTC video output. 
Experiment Structure 
Data collection for the experiment consisted of four flight scenarios, 
designated as Standard, A, B, and C (Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4).  These were all 
variations of the same arrival scenario, with the differences existing in the 
Challcnge Probe Point (CPP) of a particular scenario.  A CPP was an operational 
situation during the scenario where up to 6 tasks could become active at the samc 
instant.  The pilot had to decide the order in which the tasks were to be performed, 
then actually perform the tasks.  For example, in scenario A (Figure 5.2), the CPP 
was located at the SUNOL intersection, and was the focus of data collection for this 
scenario.  At SUNOL, an ATC call was initiated, giving a speed clearance. 
Additionally, an engine fire was initiated, requiring the pilot to perform an engine 
fire checklist.  The pilot was faced with the following 6 concurrent tasks that all 
required attention: 
I. 	 initiate a descent to 4000' 
2. 	 initiate a turn to a heading of 240 
3. 	 respond to an A  TC instruction to reduce speed to reduce speed to 180 
knots 
4. 	 reduce the aircraft's speed to  180 knots 
5. 	 perform the engine fire checklist 
6. 	 configure the displays for the ILS 
Scenarios Band C also contained similar CPP's intended for data 
collection.  The Standard scenario (Figure 5.1) does not include a CPP, and was 
used as a measurement of baseline performance for the pilot.  The order that 
subjects flew the four scenarios was a four by four Latin square design replicated 2 
times (Montgomery, 1997).  This effort was an attempt to ensure that the learning 
effects of order on the performance data were counterbalanced. 88 
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Challenge Probe Point (CPP) Questionnaire 
In  each scenario, the retrospective interviewing technique was the 
knowledge elicitation method used to collect task prioritization data (Salter, 1988; 
Cooke, 1994).  This technique was selected for its low intrusiveness, ease of 
application and as a result of the study in Chapter 4, where it  was found that no 
differences existed between the intrusive and retrospective techniques in eliciting 
information from the pilots regarding task prioritization factors. 
A very common approach to designing subjective questionnaires is the 
Likert scale (Friedenberg, 1995).  A Likert scale typically consists of a numher of 
statements to which subjects respond on a five-point scale of agreement to 
disagreement, approval to disapproval, or favorable to unfavorable, depending on 
how the statement is worded (Graham and Lilly, 1984). 
A CPP Questionnaire was developed for each of the 3 scenarios that 
contained a CPP and can be found in Appendix 5.  Each questionnaire contained 
three sections.  First, the pilot was asked the order in which the 6 tasks were 
actually performed.  Next, the pilot was presented with a set of statements 
regarding the factors that were used to determine the priority that was assigned to 
three specific tasks.  The pilot responded to this Likert-type statement (Graham and 
Lilly, 1984) with: Strongly Agree, Agree, NIA (not applicable in the current 
context), Disagree or Strongly Disagree.  For each of these statements, the pilot 
evaluated, in retrospect if his use of this factor was appropriate then was given an 
opportunity to make any comments regarding the statement or its appropriateness. 
The third section of the questionnaire gave the pilot an opportunity to re-order the 6 
tasks, then justify why he performed the tasks in such an order.  The pilot could 
also decline the opportunity to reorder the tasks if he was comfortable with the 
order in which he actually performed them. 
The model of task prioritization presented in Chapter 4 includes 12 factors 
that affect task prioritization (Figure 4.8).  These 12  factors are the result of pilots 
verbalizing factors that were used in the prioritization of tasks.  In  the present 
study, a subset of these 12  factors was selected for further investigation on the hasis 91 
of their frequency of reporting in  the earlier study.  The 6 factors included in the 
present study are status, procedure, value, urgellcy, saliellce and time/effort (for a 
thorough explanation of these factors, see Chapter 4). 
Additionally, a subset of the 6 tasks associated with each CPP was selected 
for investigation using the questionnaires.  At each CPP, exactly 3 tasks were 
probed for the factors that affected the order in which that the tasks were 
performed.  The tasks were selected based on their associated classification under 
the A viate-N avigate-Communicate-Manage Systems (ANCS) classification 
taxonomy common in  both the pilot and research communities.  Tasks were 
selected at  each CPP with ANCS classifications.  For example, in CPP-A, 
Navigate, Communicate and Manage Systems tasks were selected for inclusion in 
the probe questionnaire. 
This resulted in the formulation of a 6-factor by 9-task matrix of datapoints. 
This was the basis for the 54 statements that probed the factors that affect task 
prioritization, which made up the second section of the CPP questionnaire.  Table 
5. I is the structure for the design of these statements.  For example, in  CPP-A, the 
statement regarding the status factor of the "perform engine fire checklist" task 
(statement A3-I from table 5.1) was the following: 
I performed the engine fire checklist when I did was because I judged it to 
be the taskfarthestfrom sati!>factory completion. (A3-1) 
At each CPP, 6 statements for each of 3 tasks was posed to the subjects, 
who responded with their agreement/disagreement to the statement.  The subjects' 
response to these statements was the dependent variable in the present study, and 
provided the evidence for the use of the proposed factors that affect task 
prioritization. 92 
Factors that Affect Task Prioritization 
CPP-A Tasks  Status  Procedure  Value  Urgency  Salience  Time/Effort 
Navigate: InitiateTurn  AH  A1-2  A1-3  A1-4  A1-5  A1-6 
Communicate: Respond to 
ATC 
A2-1  A2-2  A2-3  A2-4  A2-5  A2-6 
Manage Systems: Perform 
Engine Fire Checklist 
A3-1  A3-2  A3-3  A3-4  A3-5  A3-6 
CPP-8 Tasks  Status  Procedure  Value  Urgency  Salience  Time/Effort 
Navigate: Track Localizer 
and G/S 
81-1  81-2  81-3  81-4  81-5  81-6 
Communicate: Report FAF 
toATC 
82-1  82-2  82-3  82-4  82-5  82-6 
Manage Systems: Perform 
8us Tie Contactor Checklist 
83-1  83-2  83-3  83-4  83-5  83-6 
CPP-C Tasks  Status  Procedure  Value  Urgency  Salience  Time/Effort 
Aviate: Stop descent for 
traffic 
C1-1  I  C1-2  C1-3  C1-4  C1-5  C1-6 
Navigate: Intercept the 
Localizer 
C2-1  C2-2  C2-3  C2-4  C2-5  C2-6 
Manage Systems: Attend to 
Master Warning Light 
C3-1  C3-2  C3-3  C3-4  C3-5  C3-6 
Table S. I  CPP Factor Statement Design. 
The CPP questionnaire was administered after each of the data collection 
scenarios (A, B, C).  Immediately after the scenario was over, the subject reviewed 
a videotape of the CPP and complete the questionnaire.  Again, each subject 
performed three scenarios that contained a CPP and one baseline Standard scenario 
that was a routine arrival without any unusual circumstances. 93 
Experimental Design 
This experiment measured the response of the subjects to each of the 
statements included in  the CPP questionnaire.  This value was the primary 
dependent variable upon which an analysis of variance was later applied to 
determine the extent to which the prioritization factors were used to prioritize tasks 
during the scenarios.  Following is a detailed descnption of the mixed factor design 
of the experiment. 
Dependent Variable: 
Prioritiwtioll Factor Score 
Agreement/disagreement with the use of a prioritization factor in 
determining the order that tasks were performed at a CPP. 
Independent Variables: 
Prioritiz.ation Factor 
A fixed effect variable with 6 levels (status, procedure, value, urgency, 
saliellce, time/effort). 
Task Category 
A fixed effect variable with 4 levels (aviate, navigate, communicate, 
manage systems). 
Scenario 

A fixed effect variable with 3 levels (scenario-A, scenario-B, scenario-C). 

Sul~ject 
A random effect variable with 8 levels (subjects 1-8). 
In addition to the above analysis, two other analyses were performed.  First, 
the order that subjects performed each task in the CPPs was analyzed to examine 
any trends that might be insightful as to the use of the prioritization factors. 94 
Finally, the actual performance data from the simulator was analyzed to distinguish 
the good from the poor performers. 
Simulator tasks 
The tasks performed in  the part-task simulator were consistent with the 
previous experiment (see Chapter 4.) 
Navigational equipment was limited to a single very-high-frequency 
omnirange (VOR) navigation instrument for this study (see Glossary in Appendix 1 
for definitions of aircraft instrumentation).  While this is a very minimal 
configuration, it was ample for the scenarios and is an accurate partial 
representation of true navigational tasks.  VOR displays and controls consisted of 
the navigational display, which included a VOR deviation indicator, distance 
measuring equipment (DME) distance from the ground-based VOR, course setting 
and VOR frequency.  The VOR frequency control was located on the radio 
displays, and the VOR radial input selector was located on the mode control panel 
(see Figure 5.5). 
Figure 5.5  Stone Soup Simulator Screen Shot. 9S 
Communications between the pilot and simulated ATC was perform in  a 
direct verbal exchange, as the pilot and experimenter were within approximately S 
feet of each other.  Verbal exchanges were restricted to standardized radio 
procedures and there was no free conversation between pilot and experimenter 
during data collection scenarios.  As a small added communications task, the pilot 
was required to dial in the proper communications radio frequency before an 
exchange with A TC 
Other system management tasks were performed in the simulator through 
various controls and displays.  For example, equipment malfunctions illuminated 
the caution indicator and display a message in the Engine Indication and Crew 
Altering System (EICAS) display area.  The equipment malfunctions could then be 
acknowledged and reset by performing a series of mouse click inputs to the 
multifunction display/control panel of the simulator. 
A task analysis for this study was simplified and refined from the analyses 
performed by Alter, K.W., and Regal, D.M. (1992) and McGuire, lC,  et al. 
(1990).  This resulted in the identification of the tasks listed in the pilot 
questionnaire.  This was consistent with the ANCS task taxonomy accepted in  both 
the pilot and aviation research communities, 
Procedure 
Pilots arrived for the 5-hoUJ' experiment and immediately completed an 
informed consent document (Appendix 6) and pre-trial questionnaire (Appendix 7) 
to record flight experience, age and to ensure no extenuating circumstances 
interfered with the trial, such as excessive caffeine or lack of sleep the night before. 
Pilots were then given a brief overview of the experiment.  They were 
notified that their flying performance was being measured in this experiment and 
that comments made to the experimenter would be separated from their names and 
would be kept confidential.  The sequence of the experiment consisted of 
approximately 3 hours of training on the simulator, followed by a break, then an 96 
additional 30-minute training session.  Finally, the four data-collection scenarios 
were flown on the simulator. 
The training consisted of a very structured, consistent presentation of the 
tasks needed to fly the simulator.  Appendix 8 is the syllabus used for training and 
was adapted from the NASA Aircraft Operations Manual for the Advanced 
Concepts Flight Station, which is part of the Stone Soup Simulator documentation. 
After training, a general description of the data collection procedure was 
presented, explaining how the interviewing technique was administered.  The data 
collection scenarios would then begin.  Once again, the order of the scenarios was 
determined by a Latin square design, as outlined above. 
After the pilot had completed the last data collection scenario, he was 
immediately given a post-test questionnaire, inquiring about how comfortable the 
pilot was with flying the scenario and if the training was adequate for testing 
purposes.  Additionally, the pilot was encouraged to discuss his thoughts and 
feelings about anything related to the experiment.  This completed the experiment. 97 
Results 
The data collected in this study contained several dimensions and lent itself 
to several different analyses.  The analyses presented below are all directed at the 
subjects' use of the proposed factors that affect task prioritization. 
Primal)! ANOVA 
Challenge Probe Point Questionnaire 
Each of the statements in the Challenge Probe Point (CPP) questionnaires 
(Appendix 5) were scored accordingly: 
Subject Response  Resulting Score 
Strongly Agree  +2 
Agree  +1 
N/A  0 
Disagree  -1 
Strongly Disagree  -2 
These scores were then tallied for each of the 6 prioritization factors and 9 
tasks (3  tasks from each of the 3 scenarios).  Table 5.2 presents the sum total and 
average for each of the 54 task-factor combinations, the sum total and average for 
the  18 CPP-factor combinations and finally the sum total and average for the 6 
overall prioritization factors. 98 
CPP-A Tasks  Status  Procedure  Value  Urgency  Salience  Time/Effort 
Navigate: InltlateTurn 
Sum  -5  8  7  4  -3  0 
Average  -0.63  100  0.88  0.50  -0.38  0.00 
Communicate: Respond 
to ATC 
Sum  -7  7  -10  -6  6  3 
Average  -0.88  0.88  -1.25  -0.75  0.75  0.38 
Manage Systems 
Perform Engine Fire 
Checklist 
Sum  6  7  14  8  5  -3 
Average  0.75  0.88  1.75  100  0.63  -0.38 
CPP-A Total 
Sum  -6  22  11  6  8  0 
Average  -0.25  0.92  0.46  0.25  0.33  0.00 
CPP-B Tasks  Status  Procedure  Value  Urgency  Salience  Time/Effort 
Navigate: Track Localizer 
and G/S 
Sum  -6  14  12  -3  1  2 
Average  -0.75  1.75  1.50  -0.38  0.13  0.25 
Communicate: Report 
FAF to ATC 
Sum  -5  9  -4  -6  0  4 
Average  -0.63  1.13  -0.50  -0.75  0.00  0.50 
Manage Systems· 
Perform Bus Tie 
Contactor Checklist 
Sum  0  4  3  2  8  1 
Average  0.00  0.50  0.38  0.25  1.00  0.13 
CPP-B Total 
Sum  -11  27  11  -7  9  7 
Average  -0.46  1.13  0.46  -0.29  0.38  0.29 
CPP-C Tasks  Status  Procedure  Value  Urgency  Salience  Time/Effort 
Aviate: Stop descent for 
traffic 
Sum  -4  9  11  5  11  -2 
Average  -0.50  1.13  1.38  0.63  1.38  -0.25 
Navigate: Intercept the 
Localizer 
Sum  -3  6  5  7  8  0 
Average  -0.38  0.75  0.63  0.88  1.00  0.00 
Manage Systems: Attend 
to Master Warning Light 
Sum  -2  -6  0  -7  8  -1 
Average  -0.25  -0.75  0.00  -0.88  1.00  -0.13 
CPP-C Total 
Sum  -9  9  16  5  27  -3 
Average  -0.38  0.38  0_67  0.21  1.13  -0.13 
Oveall Total 
Sum  -26  58  38  4  44  4 
Average  -0.465  0.927  0.348  -0.156  0.507  0.162 
Table S.2  Sum and  Average Results 99 
The data in Table 5.2 were the resulting scores of the Likert-type 
questionnaire developed for the CPPs.  It  is common to perform an analysis of 
variance statistical analysis of Liken-type data as long as the assumption is met that 
each statement is  unidimensional (Graham and Lilly,  1984).  In other words, the 
statement should measure only one subjective opinion and not two or more.  In  the 
case of the CPP statements, this assumption held true, as the dimension being 
measured was the pilots' agreement or disagreement with his use of each factor in 
determining the order in which to perform the CPP tasks.  The analyses presented 
below were performed using the Statgraphics Plus for Windows 3.0 software 
program from Statistical Graphics Corporation. 
Scenario 
The scenario, with three levels (A. B, C) was evaluated using analysis of 
variance and was found to have an insignificant effect.  This establishes that 
suhjects' use of the prioritization factors were independent of the scenario. 
Therefore, the scenario factor was removed from the model, resulting in a 3 factor 
mixed effect model. 
Prioritization Factors 
The CPP questionnaire values were analyzed using ANOVA.  Recall from 
the experimental design that this is a fixed effect factor having six levels (status, 
procedure, value, urgency. salience, time/effort).  These factors were found to be a 
significant effect (F(5,35) = 5.14, p < .01).  As can be seen in  Figure 5.6. over the 
entire experiment, procedure emerged as the factor most agreed to by pilots for use 
in task prioritization, followed in descending order by salience, value, time/effort, 
urgency and finally status. 100 
Prioritization Factors 
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Figure 5.6 Prioritization Factors. 
As depicted in Figure 5.6, a positive value represented supporting evidence 
that pilots used the factor in determining the priority of a particular task.  The 
corresponding magnitude of the value represented the agreement with the factor, 
using the (-2, -1, 0, + 1, +2) scale developed for the CPP questionnaires.  The 
maximum value a specific factor could be in this analysis is a +2 (strongly agree) 
score.  Similarly, a negative value corresponded to the subject reporting 
disagreement with using a particular prioritization factor (e.g.,  the status factor in 
Figure 5.6). 
Task Categories 
Each of the nine tasks probed in the CPP questionnaires were categorized 
into the ANCS classification (see Table 5.1).  This effect was found to be 
significant (F(3,2l) =6.09, P < .01).  As can be seen in Figure 5.7, the prioritization 
factors were most agreed upon by the subjects when performing the aviate tasks. 
The other tasks, in descending order, are manage systems, navigate, and finally 
communicate.  Factors with a negative score (i.e., the communicate tasks in Figure 
5.7) indicate subjects disagree with using the prioritization factors on these tasks. 101 
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Figure 5.7  Task Categories. 
Prioritization Factor - Task Category Interaction 
The prioritization factor-task category interaction was found to be highly 
significant (F(l5,105) =4.32, P < .001).  As can be seen in Figure 5.8, this finding 
establishes that the subjects' agreement with the use of the prioritization factors 
depends on which task is being evaluated for execution.  In general, the aviate and 
manage systems tasks show strong agreement, while the communicate tasks show 
strong disagreement in the status, value and urgency factors.  The navigate tasks 
show mixed results. 102 
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Figure 5.8  Factor - Category Interaction. 
Subjects 
The subjects' effect on the resulting CPP questionnaire scores were also 
found to be highly significant (F(7,240) =4.53, P < .001).  As can be seen in Figure 
5.9, four subjects reported an overall average agreement with the prioritization 
factors, while four reported an overall average disagreement.  Subject 7 reported 
the highest agreement, while subject 5 reported the lowest overall score.  This 
res ult indicates that there is little overall consistency between subjects in their 
agreement with the use of the factors that affect task prioritization. ---
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Figure 5.9  Subjects. 
Multiple range tests were performed to determine significance differences 
in  the response of the individual subjects.  Application of Fisher's least significant 
difference procedure at the 99% level resulted in the identification of 4 
homogeneous groups within the 8 subjects. 
Subject - Prioritization Factor Interaction 
The subject - prioritization factor interaction was found to be significant 
(F(35,240) = 1.93, P < .01).  As can be seen in Figure 5.10, the agreement with 
particular prioritization factor is  highly dependent upon the subject.  In other 
words, subjects show little consistency in their agreement with the use of 
prioritization factors. 104 
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Figure 5.10  Subject - Prioritization Factor Interaction. 
Task Execution Order Analysis 
The task execution order at each CPP was analyzed by adding the order in 
which each task was performed to the data set collected above for the initial 
analysis of variance.  The effect of order was found to be significant (F(5,315) = 
2.96, P < .02).  Interestingly, as can be seen in Figure 5.11, subjects appear to agree 
with the use of the prioritization factors most for the task that is performed third. 
However, a Fisher's least significant difference test at the 99% level fail to 
establish a statistical difference between the tasks performed in the first through 
fifth positions. 105 
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Figure 5.11  Task Execution Order. 
Actual Task Prioritization vs. Revised Task Prioritization 
Recall from Chapter 3, an assumption made for the present research was 
that the order that the tasks are performed in is approximately equivalent to the 
priority assigned to the tasks by the subjects.  Therefore, a second dimension of the 
data collected in the present experiment was related to the order in which the tasks 
were performed at each of the CPPs.  Again, a CPP is an operational situation in 
the scenarios where up to 6 tasks become active at the same instant.  The pilot must 
decide the order in which the tasks are performed. 
The initial part of the CPP questionnaire (Appendix 5) required the subjects 
to record the order that they performed the multiple tasks.  Table 5.3 presents the 
actual task execution order for each of the 8 subjects performing in each of the 3 
scenarios.  This was accomplished with a review of videotape of the CPP.  The 
subjects were allowed to replay the video as many times as was necessary to 
accurately record the order that the tasks were performed. 106 
CPP-A Tasks  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 
Engine Fire Checklist  5  3  1  2  5  3  2  1 
Respond to ATC  3  2  3  1  3  1  1  2 
Turn to heading 240  2  4  4  3  1  2  3  3 
Initiate descent  1  5  5  4  2  4  4  4 
Reduce speed  4  1  2  5  4  5  5  5 
Configure panel for ILS  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6 
CPP-8 Tasks 
Track the ILS  3  1  1  1  1  2  2  1 
Low fuel checklist  DNP  5  DNP  2  DNP  3  1  DNP 
Report FAF to tower  1  2  4  4  2  1  3  3 
bus tie contactor checklist  2  3  2  DNP  DNP  4  4  DNP 
final approach checklist  4  6  3  3  3  6  6  2 
270V DC circuit breaker checklist  DNP  4  5  DNP  DNP  5  5  DNP 
CPP-C Tasks 
Stop descent  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Attend to master warning lights  5  5  5  4  4  DNP  DNP  4 
Respond to ATC  3  3  2  2  2  2  4  2 
monitor/reduce airspeed  4  4  4  5  5  4  2  DNP 
turn onto localizer  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Table 5.3. Actual Task Execution Order. (DNP - Did Not Perform Task). 
In CPP-A, only two subjects, 4 and 7 performed the tasks in exactly the 
same order.  Subjects 6 and 8 were very similar, differing in the order ofjust 2 
tasks from the order selected by subjects 4 and 7.  In CPP-B, no two subjects 
performed the tasks in the same order.  However, in CPP-C, there was more 
consistency.  Subjects 1 and 2 performed the tasks identically, with all subjects 
performing the stop descent task first and there was much more consistency in the 
remaining tasks than observed in the other two CPPs. 
Additionally, the last part of the CPP questionnaire gave the pilots an 
opportunity to evaluate the order that they performed the multiple tasks.  There was 
no feedback from the experimenter regarding performance during the CPP. 
However. the subjects had just completed an evaluation of the 18 statements related 
to the prioritization factors, so they had carefully thought about their justification of 
why they performed the tasks in the order that they did.  If the subjects, in 
retrospect, revised the order that they performed the tasks, then the revised order is 
presented in Table 5.4.  Over the course of the experiment, which included 24 107 
epps, 13  times, or 54(/c!  of the time, pilots would have performed the tasks in a 
different order.  An analysis of variance on the effect of the subject's decision to 
change the execution order resulted in  no significant effect on the suhject's 
responses to the factor statements in  the CPP questionnaires. 
CPP-A Tasks  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 
Enqine Fire Checklist  3  4  1  same  same  2  1  1 
Respond to ATC  4  1  5  same  same  4  2  5 
Turn to heading 240  1  2  3  same  same  1  3  2 
Initiate descent  2  3  2  same  same  3  5  3 
Reduce speed  6  5  4  same  same  5  4  4 
Configure panel for ILS  5  6  6  same  same  6  6  6 
CPP-B Tasks 
T rack the I  LS  2  same  same  4  1  1  same  same 
Low fuel checklist  WNP  same  same  2  3  WNP  same  same 
Report FAF to tower  1  same  same  5  2  2  same  same 
bus tie contactor checklist  3  same  same  1  WNP  4  same  same 
final approach checklist  4  same  same  3  4  3  same  same 
270V DC circuit breaker checklist  WNP  same  same  6  WNP  5  same  same 
CPP-C Tasks 
Stop descent  1  same  same  same  2  same  same  1 
Attend to master warninq liqhts  5  same  same  same  4  same  same  WNP 
Respond to ATC  3  same  same  same  3  same  same  4 
monitor/reduce air~eed  4  same  same  same  5  same  same  3 
turn onto localizer  2  same  same  same  1  same  same  2 
Tahle 5.4  Revised Task Execution Order. (WNP - In retorspect, would not 
perform the task.  Same - Would not change order the tasks performed). 
Task Performallce Analysis 
The performance data collected from the flight simulator was analyzed for 
errors.  In the present study, a performance error was committed only under very 
well defined and extreme conditions (see Appendix 9).  As an example, when ATC 
issues an altitude clearance, FAA regulations stipulate that a tolerance of +/- 100 
feet from the assigned altitude is  an allowable deviation.  To constitute an altitude 
deviation error in this study, the suhjects had to deviate from the assigned altitude 
by more than +/- 200 feet.  Pilots were fully aware of these error conditions 108 
primarily through their familiarity with the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). 
Other aircraft-specific error conditions were explicitly explained to them during the 
training portion of the experiment. 
Over the course of the entire experiment, 7 subjects committed 9 
performance errors in the 24 scenarios f10wn  (Tahle 5.5).  Figure 5.12 depicts the 
average score when an error is committed, while Figure 5.13 is the score when no 
error is found.  An analysis of variance of this data found no significant differences 
between the error and non-error conditions on the subject's responses to the factor 
statements in the CPP questionnaires. 
Subject  Scenario  Error 
A  Altitude Error: Crossed SUNOL waypoint 282' low 
1  B  Fail to Perform Fuel Crossfeed Task. 
C 
Altitude Error: Altitude deviated more than +300' and -300' to 
assigned altitude 
3  B  Fail to Perform Fuel Crossfeed Task. 
4  A 
Altitude Error:  Deviated more than 300' from assigned altitude. 
Desent Rate Error:  Descended at more than 2300'/min. 
5  B  Fail to Perform Fuel Crossfeed Task. 
6  C  Altitude Error: Deviated 200' from assigned altitude 
7  A  Altitude Error: Crossed SUNOL waypoint 500' high 
8  B  Fail to Perform Fuel Crossfeed Task. 
Tahle 5.5  Task Performance Errors. 109 
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Figure 5.12  Average Score When Error is Committed. 
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Figure 5.13  Average Score When Error is Not Committed. 110 
Discussion 
Individual Differences 
One of the primary findings in this study was the individual differences 
pilots exhihited in  the task prioritization process.  This is consistent with the 
findings of Schutte and Trujillo (1996), in which they concluded CTM was largely 
dependent on individual differences between flight crews and personal style.  While 
this study considered only single pilot operations, both the statistical significance of 
the effect of subjects on the questionnaire scores and the corresponding graphical 
depiction lI1 Figure 5.10, it is apparent that there is no general prioritization vector 
for pilots as a whole, as suggested by others (e.g., Gopher, 1992; Logan, 1985; 
Adams and Pew, 1990). 
However, this is not to say that prioritization vector is a poor conceptual 
approach to a representation of the task prioritization process.  Since there is truly 
no single, optimal task execution order in the majority of situations on the flight 
deck, there may not be a single optimal task prioritization vector.  Rather than a 
prioritization vector that is applicable to pilots in general, it may be more useful to 
be able to establish several prioritization vectors that all result in equally-optimal 
task performance.  Following, then, a pilot's individual prioritization vector could 
be compared to established prioritization vectors. 
Another concept in support of the individual differences found in this study 
was the realization that each pilot has a unique knowledge base, which was used to 
apply these prioritization factors.  The pilots in this study had amazingly different 
training and experiences, ranging from military pilots, to Alaskan bush pilots, to 
flying instructors.  The expectation that individuals with such diverse experiences 
all  have similar knowledge representations and apply prioritization factors in  a 
consistent manner may be unrealistic. 
In  the present experiment, subject I had the distinction of being the worst 
performing pilot by committing a performance error at each of the 3 CPPs.  The __
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prioritization vector for subject 1 is given in Figure 5.14.  The statistical analysis 
(multiple range tests) of this vector was unable to distinguish a difference between 
it and the vectors from subjects 4, 7 and 8.  Interestingly, subjects 4,7 and 8 each 
committed an error in one of the three epps with which they were presented. 
Prioritrization Vector for Subject 1 (Worst Performer) 
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Figure 5.14  Task Prioritization Vector for Subject 1. 
Subject 2 was the best performing pilot by being the only subject to not 
commit a single error in  any of the epps.  The prioritization vector for subject 2 is 
given in Figure 5.15.  Again, a multiple range test was unable to establish a 
statistical difference in the prioritization vectors between subject 2 and subjects 3, 5 
and 6.  Again, these subjects (3, 5 and 6) committed an error in one of the three 
epps. 112 
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Figure 5.15  Task Prioritization Vector for Subject 2. 
With the limited number of data points in this study, it is not possible to 
establish the envisioned prioritization vector categories, but this may be a direction 
to pursue.  It is methodologically reassuring that subject 1 (worst performer) and 
subject 2 (best performer) did not have statistically equivalent prioritization 
vectors. 
ANCS Prioritization Hierarchy 
The conceptual basis of the ANCS task hierarchy is that tasks have inherent 
priorities that are independent of the current context.  In other words, aviate tasks 
always have a higher priority than navigate tasks, which have a higher priority than 
con:ununicate tasks, and so on.  However, it is not difficult to conceptualize 
situations in which this prioritization scheme breaks down and the tasks take on a 
priority inconsistent with the ANCS hierarchy.  For example, it may be necessary 
to perform a manage systems task, such as balancing fuel loads in wing tanks, 
before the aircraft is maneuverable enough to aviate.  In such a situation, the ANCS 
gives an invalid prioritization strategy. 113 
However, the findings in  the current study do reflect some of the 
characteristics of the ANCS prioritization scheme.  For example, the aviate tasks do 
exhibit the most agreement from pilots in  the use of the prioritization factors. 
Subjects responded with the justification of "fly the airplane first" in both the 
comments section of tbe CPP questionnaire and informal discussion after data 
collection was over. 
There arc two aspects of the results, however, that appear to contradict the 
ANCS hierarchy.  First, the communicate tasks show an overall negative agreement 
score (Figure 5.9).  Further, it is only the status, value and urgency factors that 
actually have negative scores (Figure 5.8).  With respect to value and urgency, 
pilots often lowered the priority of the communicate task when they were given the 
opportunity to change the order in which the performed the tasks.  The pilots know 
that both the value and urgency of communicate tasks are relati vel y low, yet for 
some reason they tended to perform these tasks earlier than they thought was 
appropriate.  With respect to the status factor, see the following section. 
Second, pilots performing the manage systems tasks appeared to utilize the 
prioritization factors more than might be expected.  This may be explained by 
inadequacy of the general ANCS approach.  There are many tasks on the flight 
deck that do not fit nicely into the ANCS hierarchy.  For example, a non-normal 
situation, such as an engine fire, is difficult to place at a lower priority than the 
navigate and communicate tasks.  In fact, the results indicate that pilots do not 
adhere to such a strict prioritization scheme.  In the present experiment, many of 
the manage systems tasks were of a non-normal nature and the pilots prioritized 
accordingl y. 
Accuracy ofthe Prioritization Factors 
One major inconsistency in the results was the overall negative scores of the 
status prioritization factor.  This is especially disconcerting considering status was 
the most reported factor in the initial study of prioritization factors (Chapter 4).  It 
was anticipated that status would have been an often-used factor by the subjects. 114 
That the statlls factor was resulting in disagreement by the subjects was 
apparent carl y on in the data collection.  Rather than stop the experiment after a few 
subjects, it  was decided to continue data collection, but to add some informal 
questioning of each subject after the experimental trial was over. 
It  was discovered that the particular wording of the CPP statements 
regarding the status prioritization variable was inappropriate for some of the tasks. 
This is best explained with an example.  The statement regarding the status of the 
manage system task, engine fire checklist, in CPP-A (Appendix 5, statement A3-1) 
appeared as: 
I perj'ormed the engine fire checklist when I did was because I judged it to 
be the taskfarthest from sati.\factory completion. (A3-1) 
For the subjects, this was a statement consistent with the nature of the 
engine fire checklist task (i.e., it made sense to the pilots) and the results for the 
score of this task were, in  fact. positive (Figure 5.8, status factor in the manage 
systems task category).. 
However, when a similar statement was posed to the subjects regarding an 
aviate or navigate task, the fact that these tasks are not thought of as ever being 
"complete" in the context of a flight may have affected the resulting responses by 
the subjects.  For example, a navigate task in CPP-B was to track the Instrument 
Landing System (lLS) instruments.  The statement regarding the status of this task 
was as follows (Appendix 5, statement B 1-1): 
The  reaSO/1  I [racked the ILS when I did was because I j/ldged it to be the 
task fa rtlzest from sati.\/actory completion. (B I-I) 
To the subjects, this was not an appropriate way to phrase this statement 
regarding the status of the task.  Completion of this task occurs only at landing and 
it was not the intention of the statement to assess the subject's evaluation of the 
task as related to landing the aircraft.  Rather, it was the intention to evaluate the 
deviation from the localizer and glide slop indicators the aircraft was at that 
particular instant.  This statement failed in the accurate assessment of this task and, 
in retrospect, other tasks in  the experiment. - --------------------------------------------
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The solution to this situation was, in  hindsight, rather simple.  If the 
statement had been worded slightly differently, to retlect the context of each 
category of task, it  is  anticipated that  the usc of the status factor would have shown 
a much higher score.  For example, the rewording of the B I-I statement could have 
been as follows: 
The reason I tracked the ILS when I did was hecause Ijudged it to be the 
taskfarthestji'oll/ a satislactory performance level. 
The informal feedback from the subjects, after data collection was 
complete, did not explicitly identify other obvious errors in the wording of the CPP 
statements.  Therefore, it  is assumed that the other statements resulted in 
satisfactory responses from the pilots regarding other task-factor combinations. 
The Prioritizatioll Vectors Fitted to Prelimillary Task Prioritizatioll Model 
Recall that the 6 prioritization factors investigated in the present study were 
a subset of 12  factors identified in Chapter 4.  They were selected by the frequency 
with which they were reported in the initial identification of the factors that affect 
task prioritization.  By again fitting the 6 factors back into the 3 primary 
prioritization factors of Figure 4.8, the extent to which pilots agree that they used 
the 3 primary factors of task prioritization can be seen in Figure 5.16.  In other 
words, three factors investigated in  the current study, status, saliellce and urgellcy 
arc all included in  the primary factor status from Figure 4.8.  Similarly, time/effort 
and procedure are included in the primary procedure factor.  The value factor 
stands alone and does not include multiple factors from the earlier study. 116 
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Figure 5.16  Prioritization Factors Fitted to the Preliminary Task Prioritization 
Model. 
With these results, it appears that overall procedure is the most influential 
factor that affects task prioritization.  This is not entirely surprising, as piloting of 
aircraft is highly procedural and the current training programs reflect thi  in their 
highly procedure-based philosophies. 
The effect of value was found to have more influence in task prioritization 
than was initially established in the previous study (Chapter 4).  This is reassuring, 
as the one satisfactory order to perform the tasks would be to always perform the 
most important tasks to a level of satisfactory status before attending to other, less 
important tasks.  Finally, the status factor did show limited effect in the model, but 
it is believed to have a bigger effect, as discussed in the previous section. 
Limitations 
Current resource limitations enabled the current study to only look at single 
pilot behaviors in a part-task simulator.  Since all of the subjects that participated in 
this study were current commercial transport pilots, their true operational 
environment was on a 2 pilot flight deck.  It would have been much more ------- - - ---
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ecologically valid to study 2 pilot crews.  However, it  is anticipated that this would 
have greatly reduced the workload experienced by the pilots in the CPPs, thus 
reducing the need for the pilot to prioritize 6 concurrent tasks.  Therefore, in the 
current study of prioritization factors. the high workload situations created were 
conducive for the objectives of the research. 
Although extensive training on the simulator was incorporated into the 
current experiment, it  was still a very different operational context from the actual 
aircraft the subjects fly on a day to day basis.  There are two directions future 
studies could take regarding this limitation.  On the one hand, experimentation 
could be directed towards a full-motion, high fidelity simulator.  This would 
provide an environment as close to the actual environment as possible, without 
actually flying in  the aircraft.  Current high fidelity simulators would provide an 
excellent research tool, as they are able to capture a wide range of performance 
statistics that could be used to accurately evaluate pilot performance.  However, 
there are many obstacles to overcome, such as access to such a simulator and the 
prohibitive costs. 
An alternative approach would be to not attempt to increase simulator 
fidelity, but rather to abstract task characteristics.  Computer graphical simulation 
tools are available to create multiple displays, which could represent multiple 
concurrent tasks, with remote similarities to flying tasks, but perhaps more 
generalized to allow non pilots to participate in the experiments.  It would be 
interesting to study factors that affect task prioritization for groups of humans other 
than highly trained commercial pilots.  This approach might diminish the affect of a 
pilot'S knowledge base, as discussed above, and investigate what might be 
considered a more general prioritizatIon vector. 
Conclusions 
The present study started with the conceptualization of the task 
prioritization process as a vector of factors and attempted to investigate those 
factors.  A primary conclusion is that no general prioritization vector was found in 118 
the data.  However, it may be that categories of prioritization vectors could be 
established.  Pilot prioritization schemes could then be evaluated according to these 
categories.  The prioritization vector approach may be an interesting research area 
to pursue. 
It  is  very apparent that even highly trained and skilled humans do not 
always perform task prioritization optimally when presented with multiple, 
competing tasks.  Pilots, when given the opportunity to (retrospectively) order tasks 
in a different sequence, chose to do so in more than 50% of the epps.  This finding 
is consistent with findings in other domains (Moray, et aI.,  1991). 
The ANCS hierarchy does not hold up rigidly in all circumstances. 
Subjects often performed communicate tasks much earlier than they should have, 
and acknowledged this when they reprioritized the tasks in retrospect. 
The primary contribution the present work has made is the investigation of 
factors that affect task prioritization on the flight deck.  This is by no means a 
completed task; it  is just the beginning.  While the present work has utilized and 
developed some creative methods for studying prioritization factors, there is a need 
for better, more robust and reliable methods. 119 
CHAPTER 6: 

CONCLUSIONS 

The present research has covered a lot of ground.  It began with a review of 
the existing work performed in CTM over the past decade.  Most of these early 
works approached CTM from a systems perspective, treating the prioritization of 
tasks as an explicit, rational process.  Several theories were presented, each adding 
new insight and understanding to a complex cognitive function.  Attempts at aiding 
human task management performance were investigated using CTM facilitation 
systems, some showing considerable performance improvements in the 
management of tasks. 
In  an attempt to expand and refine the theoretical dimensions of CTM, a 
human performance approach was investigated.  From these efforts, three specific 
areas were found to have significant relationships to CTM.  These three areas, task 
automaticity, voluntary control of attention and time-sharing abilities, all pointed 
toward a single, unanswered research question: What are the factors that affect task 
prioritization? 
In  an attempt to address this question. two flight simulator studies were 
performed using highly skilled commercial airline pilots.  The first study was a 
hypothesis-generation study. attempting to capture possible prioritization factor 
candidates.  The second study further investigated empirical support for those 
factors. 
In order to move beyond the obvioLls interpretations of the experimental 
results, the next section attempts to extract the key points discovered in the current 
research effort and integrate these findings into the existing CTM theory. 
Theoretical Constructs Drawn from the Current Research 
The current section analyzes the overall findings of the present research 
effort and identifies theoretical constructs relevant to CTM.  Alone, these 
theoretical constructs comprise an  incomplete theory of the CTM process. 120 
However when combined with previous works, it  IS  a move towards a better 
understanding of CTM, the tlight deck task environment, task prioritization and 
humans' abilities to manage and perform multiple, concurrent tasks. 
The theoretical constructs of CTM are categorized into four topics: (PF) the 
prioritization factors investigated; (P) the people involved in the task environment; 
(T) the task itself; and (TE) the task environment where multiple, concurrent tasks 
are performed. 
Prioritizatioll Factors 
The primary objective of the current research was to identify and investigate 
the factors that affect task prioritization on the tlight deck.  The initial experimental 
study (Chapter 4) used creative knowledge elicitation techniques to identify 12 
factors, which were condensed into a 3 primary-factor model comprised of Status, 
Procedure and Value (Figure 4.8).  The second experimental study (Chapter 5) 
collected data with the intent of developing a vector of task prioritization.  While 
the evidence suggests that there is no single prioritization vector, there are subtle 
patterns and consistencies that suggest prioritization vector categories may exist.  It 
is not known why these categories appear and is left as a topic for future research. 
While the current project has identified 3 primary prioritization factors and 
12 specific factors, it is suggested that others may exist.  For example, task 
momentum, defined as the tendency to continue the task currently being 
performed, did not appear in  any of the data collection points in either of the 
experiments.  It  is anticipated that prioritization factors such as this do, in fact, 
exist, but the current methods were unable to identify them.  Again, these 
challenges are left as the objectives of further research. 
Theoretical Constructs about PRIORITIZATION FACTORS: 
PFl. 	 Status, Procedure and Value are primary factors that affect task 
prioritization. 121 
PF2. 	 Other prioritization factors may exist, but were not identified in the present 
study. 
People 
The rl'sults from the second experimental study (Chapter 5) strongl y 
indicate that people usc different prioritization factors to determine the order in 
which tasks arc performed.  While it  is  unfortunate that a general prioritization 
factor docs not exist like some have suggested (i.e., Gopher, 1992, Logan, 1985; 
Adams and Pew,  1990). there does appear some consistency between individuals, 
which might suggest prioritization factor categories.  What specifically determines 
these categories, however, is  not clear, and may be related to complex concepts like 
personality type (Gladwell, 1999), training techniques (Gopher. 1992) and the 
inciividual pilot' s past tlight experience. 
Pilots often indicated that, in retrospect, they would haw changed the order 
in which they performed tasks at the Challenge Probe Points (CPPs).  This 
indicates prioritization in  the "heat of the moment" is often not performed in the 
same way that it  would be if the pilots were given the chance to carefully consider 
the individual tasks and the context of a challenging situation.  While it is difficult 
or even impossible to determine the optimal prioritization of the tasks at the CPPs, 
the fact that so many pilots (54%) decided to change the task execution order is an 
indication that they arc prone to execution order errors.  One reason might he that 
people arc just not optimal at ordering multiple, concurrent tasks, which is 
consistent with findings in other domains (e.g., Moray, et aI.,  1991).  Another 
reason might be that pilots just do not know what the proper task execution order at 
a CPP should be.  Further, there were many instances where pilots violated their 
well-accepted and commonly used ANCS prioritization strategy (i.e., reply to A TC 
(communicate) before initiating a descent or turn (navigate)).  This indicates that 
although pilots might know how to properly prioritize tasks, when faced with the 
decision at a CPP, they fail to do so correctly. 1'1'1
L.i... 
Theoretical Constructs about PEOPLE: 
PI.  Pilots do not all prioritize multiple, concurrent tasks in  the same way. 
P2.  Pilots would often change task execution order when given the chance to 
retrospectively evaluate a situation. 
P3.  Pilots are prone to prioritization errors in challenging situations. 
Tasks 
The present study was not primarily concerned about the performance of 
specific tasks, however, as established in Chapter 3, the automaticity of a task 
determines how much of the human's attentional resources are needed to perform 
it.  In general, the more automated a task becomes, the less resources are required 
for the pilot to perform it.  However, some tasks (i.c., communicate tasks) are just 
not good candidates for automatic behavior, and should be performed in a 
controlled processing mode.  Therefore, pilots should be trained to automate many 
tasks allowing for a reduced attentional load, and freeing up resources for the 
demands of those tasks that are best performed in controlled processing mode. 
The ANCS task classification hierarchy is commonly used by pilots and is a 
basis for their default prioritization strategy.  While it provides a good fundamental 
approach, it has some shortcomings and pilots do not always strictly adhere to it. 
For example, it  was often the case in the second experiment (Chapter 5) that pilots 
replied to an ATC clearance almost instantaneously, in spite of the fact that other 
higher priority tasks were in demand of the pilot's attention (i.e., initiate descent, 
initiate turn).  Additionally, under a strict ANCS strategy, an  engine fire checklist 
(manage systems task) would have a lower priority than the A  TC response 
(communicate task).  Obviously, in such a situation, the pilot should attend to an 
on-board fire before acknowledging an A  TC clearance, such as a speed reduction 
for aircraft spacing (i.e., a low priority task that is  not immediately threatening). 123 
Theoretical Constructs about TASKS: 

'1'1.  The automaticity of tasks determines the resource requirements. 

'1'2.  Tasks should be, to a large extent, performed in  AP mode. 

'1'3.  Some tasks are not good candidates for automatization. 

T4.  The ANCS prioritization strategy is, in general, a good task prioritization 

approach. 
T5.  The ANCS prioritization strategy has shortcomings. 
'1'6.  Pilots do not always follow the ANCS prioritization strategy. 
Task Envirolllllellt 
In  both experiments (Chapters 4 and 5), while there were differences in the 
usc of individual prioritization factors, there was consistency from scenario to 
scenario.  In other words, whatever the pilot's specific prioritization vector was, he 
applied it consistently from situation to situation.  This is supporting evidence that 
the prioritization strategy of a pilor is not a random phenomenon, but a mental 
process that is  systematically applied to the prioritization of tasKs, whether 
consciously or not. 
While the experiments in the current research did not undertake specific 
training techniques, the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 indicate that voluntary 
control of attention is a trainable skill and can be improved through the use of 
techniques such as variable-priority training (Gopher, 1992) and augmented 
feedback (Navon and Gopher, 1979: Gopher, et a1..  1982).  This is  support for the 
LIse of CTM facilitation systems, such as the AgendaManager (Funk, et aI.,  1997: 
Funk, et aI.,  1999) as training aids.  This suggests that instead of CTM facilitation 
on the flight deck, CTM facilitation can be used to better train pilots in the skill of 
managing multiple, concurrent tasks. 
Theoretical Constructs about TASK ENVIRONMENT: 
TE  1.  Pilots consistently apply their task prioritization vector. 124 
TE2. 	 Training of attentional control can be accomplished through CTM 
facilitation. 
Summary CTM Theory 
The theoretical constructs presented in  the previous section summarize the 
findings of the present research efforts. Alone, these theoretical constructs comprise 
an incomplete representation of the CTM process.  In the present section, these 
constructs are combined with findings of previous works (see Chapters 2 and 3) to 
present an overall theory of CTM. 
The CTM theory contains three main sections: general CTM theory, tlight 
deck task environment theory and task prioritization theory.  Table 6.1  summarizes 
general knowledge about CTM, which comes from the works of many authors, 
including Funk, Wickens, Gopher and Rogers.  CTM theory specific to the flight 
deck task environment is summarized in Table 6.2.  This part of the CTM theory is 
primarily from the experimental psychology domain with contributions from 
authors such as Schneider, Shiffrin, Wickens, Tenny and Pew.  Finally, Table 6.3 
presents theoretical details related to the prioritization of tasks.  It is in this area that 
the findings of the current research have made specific contributions.  These 
contributions to the task prioritization theory are presented in bold, italicized font in 
Table 6.3. 
Final Comments 
In conclusion, one thing is crystal clear: The task prioritization process is 
not yet fully understood.  It is a complex cognitive function that uses not only 
environmental cues, but also internal knowledge representations that may be a 
function of a person's past experiences.  To fully understand task prioritization may 
be to fully understand human cognition.  Although science is  not yet there, it is 
through the efforts of research, such as the current work, that new insights into 
these topics are discovered. General CTM Theory  Justification  Source 
CTM is a mental process by which pilots manage multiple, 
concurrent tasks 
The performance of multiple tasks adds 
another management dimension to the 
performance of single tasks 
Funk (1991); Wickens (1992) 
A primary dimension of CTM  is  the voluntary control 
of attention 
Experimental results from other research 
efforts 
Gopher (1992) 
Voluntary control of attention can be aided by 
augmented system feedback 
Experimental results from other research 
efforts 
Navon and Gopher (1979); Gopher, 
et al  (1982) 
Training of attentional control can be 
accomplished through augmented system 
feedback 
Experimental results from other research 
efforts 
Navon and Gopher (1979); Gopher, 
et al  (1982) 
CTM performance can be improved through 
CTM facilitation 
Superior CTM performance using pilot aids 
in simulator studies 
Funk and Lind (1992); Funk and 
Kim (1995); Funk, et al  (1997) 
-
CTM errors contribute, at least in part, to accidents and 
incidents 
~-
CTM errors are present in a significant 
number of aircraft accidents and incidents 
Chou (1991); Madhavan (1993); 
Wilson (1998); 
CTM can be divided into Strategic and Tactical Cockpit Task 
Management 
Conceptual analysis and pilot interviews  Rogers (1996) 
CTM is largely dependent on individual differences  Simulator study results and analysis 
Task prioritization experiment 
#2; Schutte and Trujillo (1996) 
Table 6.1  General CTM Theory. Flight Deck Task Environment Theory  Justification  Source 
Flight deck tasks are categorized into discrete, pre-planned 
tasks and continuous, repetitive tasks 
Conceptual analysis and pilot interviews  Rogers (1996) 
The automaticity of tasks determines their resource 
requirements 
Automated tasks require less mental 
resources than tasks performed in 
controlled processing mode 
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977); 
Wickens (1992) 
Tasks should be, to a large extent, performed in AP 
mode 
Automating tasks free mental resources so 
pilot can manage multiple, concurrent tasks 
Wickens (1992); Damos (1991) 
Some tasks are not good candidates for 
automatization 
- -
Specific task characteristics require 
controlled processing 
Allport (1992); Tenny and Pew 
(1990); Norman (1988) 
Table 6.2  Flight Deck Task Environment Theory Task Prioritization Theory  Justification  Source 
Resource conflicts due to multiple, concurrent tasks are 
resolved using task prioritization 
Humans can devote thoughtful, conscious 
attention to only one task at a time 
Funk (1991); Adams and Pew 
(1990); Adams, et al  (1991) 
Scheduling of tasks is the dominant CTM processes  Conceptual analysis and pilot interviews  Rogers (1996) 
CTM is time-driven 
The overriding CTM process is scheduling 
or ordering of tasks 
Rogers (1996) 
Pilots are prone to prioritization errors in challenging 
situations 
9 performance errors in 24 scenarios 
Task prioritization experiment 
#2 
Pilots would often change the task execution order 
when given the chance to retrospectively evaluate a 
situation 
Majority of subjects changed task 
execution order 
Task prioritization experiment 
#2 
The ANCS prioritization strategy is,  in general, a good task 
prioritization approach 
Pilots very seldom make task prioritization 
errors with catastrophic results 
Excellent aviation safety record 
The ANCS prioritization strategy has 
shortcomings 
Specific situations require violation of 
ANCS strategy 
Current research analysis 
Pilots do not always follow the ANCS 
prioritization strategy 
Pilots task execution order did not 
strictly adhere to the ANCS strategy 
Task prioritization experiment 
#2; Schutte and Trujillo (1996) 
Table 6.3  Task Prioritization Theory. 
N 
-..) Task Prioritization Theory - Continued  Justification  Source 
CTM is composed of 2 activities: workload management and 
monitoring of the situation 
Simulator study results and analysis  Schutte and Trujillo (1996) 
Workload management and monitoring can be 
accomplished by: ANCS, perceived severity, 
procedure-based or event-driven strategies 
Simulator study results and analysis  Schutte and Trujillo (1996) 
Workload management is best performed 
using the perceived severity strategy 
Simulator study results and analysis  Schutte and Trujillo (1996) 
Monitoring is best achieved using the ANCS 
strategy 
Simulator study results and analysis  Schutte and Trujillo (1996) 
Task prioritization is performed by an evaluation of a vector 
of factors 
Conceptual analysis 
Gopher (1992); Adams and Pew 
(1990); Logan (1985) 
Pilots do not all prioritize multiple, concurrent 
tasks in the same way 
Significant individual differences found 
Task prioritization experiment 
#2 
Pilots consistently apply their task prioritization 
vector 
No statistical difference in use of factors 
between scenarios 
Task prioritization experiment 
#2 
Status, Procedure and Value are primary factors 
that affect task prioritization 
Empirical results supported presence of 
factors 
Task prioritization experiments 
#1 and #2 
Other prioritization factors may exist, but were 
not identified in  the present study 
Limitations of research methods may 
fail to identify prioritization factors 
Task prioritization experiments 
#1 and #2 
Table 6.3  Task Prioritization Theory - Continued ----------------------------------------------------
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Appendix 1 

Glossary 

Accident - A catastrophic event in which substantial damage is  sustained to an 
aircraft or human lives are lost. 
Air Traffic Control - A system used to monitor and direct air traffic 
ANCS - see Aviate-Navigate-Communicate-Manage Systems 
ASRS - see Aviation Safety Reporting System 
ATC - see Air Traffic Control 
Attitude Indicator - A flight instrument that gives the pilot an indication of the 
attitude of the aircraft relative to its pitch and roll axes. 
A viate-Navigate-Communicate-Manage Systems - A classification system that 
establishes general rules for the prioritization of tasks on the flight deck.  Aviate 
tasks have a higher priority than navigate tasks, which have a higher priority than 
communicate tasks, etc.  It  is a general framework taught early in training and well 
accepted in the aviation research community. 
A viation Safety Reporting System - A voluntary, confidential incident reporting 
system managed by NASA for the FAA. 
Cockpit Task Management - In  the context of the commercial flight deck, the 
function in which the human operator manages his/her available sensory and 
mental resources in a dynamic, complex, safety-critical environment in order to 
accomplish the multiple tasks competing for a limited quantity of attention. 
CTM - sec Cockpit Task Management 
EICAS - see Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System 
Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System - An electronic instrument system 
for modern turbine-powered aircraft that senses engine (and other) parameters and 
displays them on one of two multicolor display units on the instrument panel. 
FAA - see Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR - see Federal Aviation Regulations 137 
Federal Aviation Administration - The body of the U.S. government with 
primary responsibility for safety in civil aviation. 
Federal Aviation Regulations - Regulations established by the Federal Aviation 
Administration which govern the operation of aircraft, airways, and airmen. 
Compliance with FARs is mandatory. 
ILS - sec Instrument Landing System 
Incident - In the context of aviation, an incident is the occurrence of a regulations 
violation or an unsafe situation that is rectified before a more critical situation 
develops. 
Instrument Landing System - A special type of electronic guidance system used 
to allow aircraft to land when the ceiling and visibility are too low for a safe visual 
approach to the runway.  An ILS is made up of four basic parts: the localizer, glide 
slope, marker beacons, and approach lights. 
Localizer - The portion of an instrument landing system that directs the pilot of an 
aircraft down the center line of the instrument runway for the final approach in an 
instrument landing. 
National Transportation and Safety Board - The agency responsible for 
investigating civil aviation accidents occurring in the U.S. and for providing U.S. 
Accredited Representatives to non-U.S. accident investigating boards when 
necessary.  The NTSB also is responsible for issuing safety recommendations to the 
FAA aimed at preventing future accidents. 
NTSB - see National Transportation Safety Board 
Very-high frequency omnirange navigation equipment - A  type of electronic 
navigation equipment in which the instrument on the flight deck identifies the 
radial, or line from the VOR station measured in degree clockwise from magnetic 
north, along which the aircraft is located. 
VOR - see Very-high frequency omnirange navigation equipment 138 
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Informcd Consent Document for Expcriment 
Department of Industrial & Manufacturing Engineering 

Oregon State University 

INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
I understand that I will participate in  nIght deck automation research conducted under the 
supervision of Dr. Ken Funk of the Industrial &  Manufacturing Engineering Department.  I 
understand that in this experiment I will use my aviation knowledge and skills to tly a computer­
based, part-task tlight simulator.  After a half-hour training session I will fly a set of flight scenarios. 
The entire experiment should last no longer than two hours. 
I am aware that this is an unpaid experiment.  Although physiological risks during the experiment 
arc minimal, I understand that I will experience a level of psychological stress comparable to that of 
playing a video game during the experiment.  While the experiment is being run, the evaluator will 
videotape the tlight operation and later ask questions for data collection purposes. 
My identity will not be released to any other persons, organizations, or publicatIons.  All references 
to subjects in  thi~ study will be encoded and kept confidential, and all identity-related informatIon 
(including videotapes) destroyed within three years of the experiment. 
I understand that any questions concerning aspects or rights related to this experiment should be 
directed to Dr. Ken Funk at 541-737-2357.  I understand that Oregon State University does not 
provide compensation or medical treatment in the event the subject is injured as a result of 
participation in  this study. 
I understand that participatIon is  voluntary, and my refusal to participate will not result in penalties 
or loss of benefits that I am otherwise entitled.  My signature below indicates that I have read and 
that I understand the procedures described above and give my informed and voluntary consent to 
participate in this study.  I understand that I will receive a signed copy of this consent form. 
Subject's Signature  Date Signed 
Subject's Name 
Subject's Phone Number ---------------- - ---
139 
Appendix 3 
Pre-Trial Questionnaire for Experiment 
Name: ___________ Age: __ SubJect #: ___ 
Current seat: 
Captain 
First Officer 
Flight Engineer 
Other: 
Current Aircraft Type Certificate: 
Total Flying Time: ____  Approximate Single-Pilot Time: ___ 
Approximate EFIS time: 
Certificates/Rati ngs: 
Private 
Instrument 
Multi-engine 
Commereial 
CFI 
ATP 
Other: ________ 
Have you recently taken any medicatIOn that is likely to affect your tlying and decision-making 
skills') 
No 
Yes 
Have you cOllsumed an unusual amount of caffeine today') 
No 
Yes, I//(}r(' than usual 
Yes, less than usual 
Are there any circumstances today that might affect your ability to fly? 
No 
Yes I 
140 
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Appendix 4 
Post-Trial Questionnaire for Experiment 
Suhject # 
Did you receive adequate training to serve the purpose of this experiment, as you understand 
it'?  Explain. 
Rate the overall difficulty of the flying in this experiment, as compared to your actual flying 
experience. 
Much easier 
Easier 
Roughly equivalent 
More difficult 
Much more difficult 
Please elaborate briefly: 
What other comments do you have concerning the research or your experience with the 
expcriment'? 
Finally. if you have any questions regarding the experiment. don't hesitate to ask the experimenter. 141 
Appendix 5 

Challenge Probe Point Questionnaires 

Questiollllaire for CPP-A: 
At this point in the flight, there were at least the following 6 tasks active. 
Please list the order that you performed these tasks in  from 1-6. Use the videotape 
to assist you if needed: 
configure panel for ILS 

turn to heading 240
0 

respond to A  TC clearance 

engine fire checklist 

initiate descent 

reduce speed 

Other task(s) not listed: _________ 

Where does this task(s) fit in the order?: 

On the next pages, there are 18 statements related to the order in which the 
above tasks were performed.  For each statement, select the choice that is, in your 
opinion, the most accurate for the statement and situation.  The choices are: 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
NIA - If the statement is not relevant to the situation or you neither agree nor 
disagree with the statement, select the NtA choice. 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Additionally, you will be asked if your response to the statement was 
appropriate for the situation.  In other words, in retrospect, was the decision you 
made a good one? 
Please think carefully about each statement and answer as accurately as 
possible. I initiated the turn to 240 when I did was because I judged it to 
be the task farthest from satisfactory completion. (A 1-1) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I initiated the turn to 240 when I did was because 
it was consistent with standard operating procedures. (A1-2) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I initiated the turn to 240 when I did was because 
if I didn't, the consequences were worse than for the tasks I 
performed after initiating the turn. (A 1-3) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I initiated the turn to 240 when I did was because 
I had less time to perform it than the tasks I performed after it. 
(A1-4) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I initiated the turn to 240 when I did was because 
the heading instruments caught my attention. (A 1-5) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I initiated the turn to 240 when I did was because 
of the time and/or effort required to perform the turn. (A1-6) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: I responded to ATC when I did was because I judged it to be 
the task farthest from satisfactory completion. (A2-1) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I responded to ATC when I did was because it 
was consistent with standard operating procedures. (A2-2) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I responded to ATC when I did was because if I 
didn't, the consequences were worse than for the tasks I 
performed after responding. (A2-3) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I responded to ATC when I did was because I had 
less time to perform it than the tasks I performed after it.  (A2­
4) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I responded to ATC when  I did was because the 
incoming ATC message caught my attention. (A2-5) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I responded to ATC when I did was because of 
the time and/or effort required to  reply. (A2-6) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: I performed the engine fire checklist when I did was because I 
judged it to be the task farthest from satisfactory completion. 
(A3-1 ) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I performed the engine fire checklist when I did 
was because it was consistent with standard operating 
procedures. (A3-2) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I performed the engine fire checklist when I did 
was because if  I didn't, the consequences were worse than 
for the tasks I performed after it.  (A3-3) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I performed the engine fire checklist when I did 
was because I had less time to perform it than the tasks I 
performed after it. (A3-4) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I performed the engine fire checklist when I did 
was because the master warning light and EICAS message 
area caught my attention. (A3-5) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I performed the engine fire checklist when I did 
was because of the time and/or effort required to perform it. 
(A3-6) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 145 
Aftcr answering the questions on the previous pages and carefully thinking 
about this situation, would you change the order you performed these tasks'?  In 
other words, in  your opinion, is there a more optimal order in which you could have 
performed these tasks'? 
No, same order, no changes. (If "no", then the qucstionnaire is 
complete.) 
Yes, I would perform the tasks in the following order: 
configure panel for ILS 
turn to heading 240
0 
respond to ATe clearance 
engine fire checklist 
initiate descent 
reduce speed 
Please briet1y explain why you decided to change the order you would 
perform the tasks: 146 
Questiollnaire for CPP-B: 
At this point in the flight, there were at least the following 6 tasks active. 
Please list the order that you performed these tasks in from  1-6.  Use the videotape 
to assist you if needed: 
low fuel checklist 

report F AF to tower 

bus tie contactor checklist 

final approach checklist 

track the ILS (Localizer and GIS) 

270V DC circuit breaker checklist 

Other task(s) not listed: _________ 

Where does this task(s) fit  in the order?: 

On the next pages, there are 18 statements related to the order in which the 
above tasks were performed.  For each statement, select the choice that is, in your 
opinion, the most accurate for the statement and situation.  The choices are: 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
NIA - If the statement is not relevant to the situation or you neither agree nor 
disagree with the statement, select the NIA choice. 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Additionally, you will be asked if your response to the statement was 
appropriate for the situation.  In other words, in retrospect, was the decision you 
made a good one? 
Please think carefully about each statement and answer as accurately as 
possible. The reason I tracked the ILS when I did was because I judged 
it to be the task farthest from satisfactory completion. (B1-1) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I tracked the ILS when I did was because it was 
consistent with standard operating procedures. (B1-2) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I tracked the ILS when I did was because if  I 
didn't, the consequences were worse than for the tasks I 
performed after it.  (B1-3) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I tracked the ILS when I did was because I had 
less time to perform it than the tasks I performed after it.  (B1­
4) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I tracked the ILS when I did was because flight 
instruments caught my attention. (B1-5) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I tracked the ILS when I did was because of the 
time and/or effort required to track it.  (B1-6) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: The reason I reported the FAF to ATC when I did was 
because I judged it to be the task farthest from satisfactory 
completion. (82-1) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I reported the FAF to ATC when I did was 
because it was consistent with standard operating 
procedures. (82-2) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I reported the FAF to ATC when I did was 
because if  I didn't, the consequences were worse than for the 
tasks I performed after it.  (82-3) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I reported the FAF to ATC when I did was 
because I had less time to perform it than the tasks I 
performed after it.  (82-4) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I reported the FAF to ATC when I did was 
because the task somehow caught my attention.  (82-5) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I reported the FAF to ATC when I did was 
because of the time and/or effort requi red to report it.  (82-6) 
-
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: -----------
- --------------------------------------
The reason I performed the bus tie contactor checklist when I 
did was because I judged it to be the task farthest from 
satisfactory completion. (83-1) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I performed the bus tie contactor checklist when I 
did was because it was consistent with standard operating 
procedures. (83-2) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I performed the bus tie contactor checklist when I 
did was because if I didn't, the consequences were worse 
than for the tasks I performed after it.  (83-3) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I performed the bus tie contactor checklist when I 
did was because I had less time to perform it than the tasks I 
performed after it.  (83-4) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I performed the bus tie contactor checklist when I 
was because the master warning light and EICAS message 
area caught my attention. (83-5) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I performed the bus tie contactor checklist when I 
did was because of the time and/or effort required to perform 
it.  (83-6) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 150 
After answering the questions above and carefully thinking about this 
situation, would you change the order you performed these tasks?  In other words, 
in  your opinion, is there a more optimal order 1I1  which you could have performed 
these tasks? 
No, same order, no changes. (If "no", then the questionnaire is 
complete.) 
Yes, I would perform the tasks in  the following order: 
low fuel checklist 
report F AF to tower 
bus tie contactor checklist 
final approach checklist 
track the ILS (Localizer and GIS) 
270V DC circuit breaker checklist 
Please briefly explain why you decided to change the order you would 
perform the tasks: 151 
Questionnaire for CPP-C: 
At this point in  the flight, there were at least the following 5 tasks active. 
Please list the order that you performed these tasks in from  1-5. Use the videotape 
to assist you if needed: 
stop descent (level off) 

monitor/reduce airspeed 

turn onto the localizer 

respond to A  TC instruction 

attend to the master warning light 

Other task(s) not listed: _________ 

Where docs this task(s) fit in the order?: 

On the next pages, there are 18 statements related to the order in which the 
above tasks were performed.  For each statement, select the choice that is, in your 
opinion, the most accurate for the statement and situation.  The choices are: 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A - If the statement is not relevant to the situation or you neither agree nor 
disagree with the statement, select the N/A choice. 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Additionally, you will be asked if your response to the statement was 
appropriate for the situation.  In other words, in retrospect, was the decision you 
made a good one? 
Please think carefully about each statement and answer as accurately as 
possible. The reason I leveled off when I did was because I judged it to 
be the task farthest from satisfactory completion. (C1-1) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I leveled off when I did was because it was 
consistent with standard operating procedures. (C1-2) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I leveled off when I did was because if I didn't, the 
consequences were worse than for the tasks I performed 
after it.  (Cl-3) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I leveled off when I did was because I had less 
time to perform it than the tasks I performed after it.  (C1-4) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I leveled off when I did was because the call from 
ATC caught my attention. (C1-5) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I leveled off when I did was because of the time 
and/or effort required to perform it.  (C1-6) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
u\ 
to -
The reason I turned onto the localizer when I did was because 
I judged it to be the task farthest from satisfactory completion. 
(C2-1 ) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I turned onto the localizer when I did was because 
it was consistent with standard operating procedures. (C2-2) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I turned onto the localizer when I did was because 
if I didn't, the consequences were worse than for the tasks I 
performed after it.  (C2-3) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I turned onto the localizer when I did was because 
I had less time to perform it than the tasks I performed after it. 
(C2-4) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I turned onto the localizer when  I did was because 
flight instruments caught my attention. (C2-5) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I turned onto the localizer when  I did was because 
of the time and/or effort required to turn onto it.  (C2-6) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: The reason I was trying to figure out why the master warning 
light was flashing when I did was because I judged it to be the 
task farthest from satisfactory completion. (C3-1) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I was trying to figure out why the master warning 
light was flashing when I did was because it was consistent 
with standard operating procedures. (C3-2) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I was trying to figure out why the master warning 
light was flashing when I did was because if I didn't, the 
consequences were worse than for the tasks I performed 
after it.  (C3-3) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I was trying to figure out why the master warning 
light was flashing when I did was because I had less time to 
perform it than the tasks I performed after it. (C3-4) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I was trying to figure out why the master warning 
light was flashing when I did was because the master warning 
light caught my attention. (C3-5) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 
The reason I was trying to figure out why the master warning 
light was flashing when I did was because of the time and/or 
effort required to do it.  (C3-6) 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
N/A 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Was this appropriate? 
Yes / No 
Additional Comments: 155 
Arter answering the questions above and carefully thinking ahout this 
situation, would you change the order you performed these tasks?  In  other words, 
in  your opinion, is  there a more optimal order in  which you could have performed 
these tasks? 
No, same order, no changes. Of "no", then the questionnaire is 
complete.) 
Yes, I would perform the tasks in the following order: 
stop descent (level off) 
monitor/reduce airspeed 
turn onto the localizer 
respond to A TC instruction 
attend to the master warning light 
Please hriefly explain why you decided to change the order you would 
perform the tasks: 156 
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Informed Consent Document for Experiment 2 

Department of[ndllstria/ &  A1allllfactllring Engineering 
Oregoll StOle Ullil'crsity 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
I understand that I will participate in tlight deck automation research conducted under the 
supervision of Dr. Ken Funk of the Industrial & Manufacturing Engineering Department.  I 
understand that in this experiment I will use my aviation knowledge and skills to tly a computer­
based, part-task tlight simulator.  After a half-hour training session I will tly a set of tlight scenarios. 
The entire experiment should last no longer than five hours. 
Although physiological risks during the experiment are minimal, I understand that r will experience 
a level of psychologIcal stress comparable to that of playing a video game during the experiment. 
While the experiment is  being run, the evaluator will  videotape the tlight operation and later r will 
fill  out a questionnaire for data collection purpose~. 
My identity will not be released to any other persons, organizations, or publications.  All references 
to subjects in  this study will be encoded and kept confidential, and all identity-related information 
(including videotapes) destroyed within three years of the experiment. 
I understand that any questions concerning aspects or rights related to this experiment should be 
directed to Dr. Ken Funk at 541-737-2357.  I understand that Oregon State University does not 
provide compensation or medical treatment in  the event the subject is  injured as a result of 
participation in this study. 
I understand that participation is  voluntary, and my refusal to participate will not result in penalties 
or loss of benefits that I am otherwise entitled.  My signature below indicates that I have read and 
that I understand the procedures described above and give my informed and voluntary consent to 
participate in  this study.  I understand that I will receive a signed copy of this consent form. 
Subject's Signature  Date Signed 
Subject's Name 
Subject's email Address (or phone number) 157 
Appendix 7 

Pre-Trial Questionnaire for Experiment 2 

Pilot Background Questionnaire 
Name: ___________  Age: ___  Subject #: 
Current seat: 

Captain 

First Officer 

Other: _________ 

Current Aircraft Type Certificate: __________ 

Total Flying Time: ______  Approximate Single-Pilot Time: ___ 

Approximate EFTS "Glass cockpit" time: ______ 

Certificates/Rati ngs: 

Private 

Instrument 

Multi-engine 

Commercial 

CFI 

AT!' 

Other: 

Have you recently taken any medication that is likely to affect your t1ying and decision-making 

skills') 

No 

Yes 

Have you consumed an unusual amount of caffeine today') 

No 

Yes, more than usual 

Yes, less than usual 

Are there any circumstances today that might affect your ability to t1y? 

No 

Yes 
158 
Appendix 8 
Simulator Training Syllabus 
Simulator Traillillg: 
General Intro. to the disp!avs: 
• 	 General description of the displays 
• 	 Explain how they have to use two mice and that will take getting use to. 
• 	 Only I VOR for navigation 
Initial Aircraft Control: 
• 	 Start the sim with the exp2.dat and let them maintain altitude. 
• 	 Explain the Flight Director command bars 
• 	 Do some banks to headings (while still heading away from ECA). 
• 	 Explain the VOR and controls. 
• 	 Dial in OAK VOR and track to it. 
• 	 Explain the ALT BUG and descents (VIS mode, VIS rate) 
• 	 Descent rate is  1000'  Imin.  This is the desired rate of descent.  1500'Imin. 
would be considered extreme and 2000'/min. is considered unsafe for this 
aircraft. 
• 	 Descend down to  1800'.  When an altitude assignment is given, fly it within +1­
100',just as the PARs specify. 
• 	 Climb back to 6000' 
• 	 Level off and maintain 6000' 
• 	 Give speed settings.  Explain speed limitations: 250 kts. under 10,000'; 
Intercepting the locali::.er alld glide slope: 
• 	 Start the sim with the "final.dat" scenario. 
• 	 Specs: at  1800', DME 18 from SFO, on 240 heading, speed 205, flaps 15 (you 
need to configure the ILS stuff) 
• 	 Explain the general idea. Explain what the "app" button does. 
• 	 Explain the mode annunciation on the pfd 
• 	 Have them memorize the procedure to configure for the ILS 
• 	 Run through the scenario until they get it.  (Twice?) 159 
Introdl/ction to sc(,nario: 
• 	 Start the sim with the "cxp2.dat and explain the scenario (using the low £lIt. 

chart).  No speed modifications on this scenario. 

• 	 Give initial clearance: 
"OSU I 23, cross SUNOL at 6000'.  After SUNOL, descend to 4000', turn right 
heading 240
0  vector for the ILS. 
• 	 Make surc they make thc turn at SUNOL. 
• 	 At DME 20: 

"OSU I 23, Dcscend to  1800', cleared for the ILS, report BRIll to tower on 

119.0" 

• 	 Make surc they report thc FAF 
• 	 Terminatc at the 1M. 
COll/igll ratioll for landing: 
• 	 There are two checklists to be performed. 
• 	 The arrival/descent checklist can be performed whenever you want. 
• 	 The final approach checklist should be performed after gear down. This should 
occur at  the FAF. So: At BRIll, Gear Down -> final approach checklist. 
• 	 You should be at 165 at  the FAF (BRIll). 
• 	 The placard on the monitor shows the flaps speeds.  You should be at or below 
the speeds before setting the flaps.  Gear down is below 180 kts. and landing 
speed is  150 kts.  Aircraft limitation is +20 kts. over flap speed settings. DO 
NOT EXCEED FLAP SPEED LIMITATIONS. 
• 	 Reset the "exp2.dat"  scenario and let them run it.  Standard clearances. 
• 	 Go again if necessary 
Svst(,111  Faults: 
• 	 Start the sim with the ·'exp2.dat" scenario. Start it and put it on autopilot. 
• 	 Read through malfunction docs. with subject.  Explain the significance of each 
malfunction. 
• 	 These must all be memory items, so we will practice until you can do them all 
from memory. 
• 	 Introduce all malfunctions and have them practice them, until they can do them 
from memory. Freeze the sim and talk about each one in detail from the system 
sheets. 
• 	 Engine fire will be most difficult. After shutting down engine, let them get used 
to flying with only one engine. Fly for a while on a single engine, turns, 
descents, etc. 
(about 2.5  hours to here) 160 
F/r3-4 Scenarios with Ma(fullclions: 
• 	 Make sure to do an engine out on the 240
0  leg. 
• 	 Do some stuff on final 
• 	 Take notes and give them feedback as necessary after each flight is over. 
Give Final Instructions: 
• 	 If anything unusual happens during the next four flights, handle it as best as you 
can, but try to handle it as you would in actual operation. 
• 	 You will be flying in the San Francisco class B airspace.  You should fl y 
according to all the FARs that you would if you were to actually operate in this 
aIrspace. 
• 	 If you need to call off an approach or request something from A TC, go ahead 
and do it.  I will attempt to fill the role of ATe. 
• 	 I'I1l looking for you to behave as you would while flying. Don't try to gi ve me 
what I expect, just try to fly as you would normally. 161 
Appendix 9 

Task Performance Errors 

A conservative approach was taken to define what constitutes a 
performance error.  The basis of these definitions lies in either the Federal Aviation 
Regulations or in  situations with obvious safety implications.  These criteria were 
specifically explained to the subjects during training. 
Fail to Perform Fuel Crossfeed Task - A warning indicator alerting the 
pilot to a low fuel condition in the left tank was to be corrected by performing a 
fuel  crossfeed from the right fuel tank.  At the outset of this situation, less than 100 
Ibs. of fuel was available for the left engine.  Approximately 2 minutes of fuel was 
available before the left tank would empty, stalling the left engine.  Failure to 
perform this task was determined to be an error. 
Altitude Error - A deviation in the altitude of more than +1- 200' from the 
ATe-assigned altitude.  FARs specify this deviation to be +1- 100 feet. 
Speed /<"'rror - A significant speed deviation in  one of the following 
categories: ( I )More than +20 kts. over the flap setting speed (safety consideration 
due to limitations of the aircraft). (2)Exceed 250 kts. under 10,000' (A FAR 
limitation). 
Failure to Comply with ATC Vector - Failure to initiate turn within 2 miles 
of an ATe clearance.  (A FAR limitation). 
Descellt Rate Error - Descents were occur at  a rate of 1000'Imin.  A 
descent rate in excess of 2000'Imin. was determined to be an error (safety 
consideration due to aircraft limitations). 